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TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION:   
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
Charles O. Lerche III 
 
For countries just emerging from a struggle against oppression and tyranny the first 
challenge is whether to blindly forgive past oppressors or hunt them down and punish them. 
Often there seems to be a choice between reconciliation or justice, instead of attaining a 
balance between the two. 
      International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998b 
 
Justice in itself is not a problematic objective, but whether the attainment of justice always 
contributes to reconciliation is anything but evident. Truth, too, is a good thing; but as the 
African proverb reminds us, 'truth is not always good to say.  
     Ignatieff, 1996 
 
Introduction 
The “Post-Cold War” world presents staggering contrasts.  On the one hand, the threat of 
annihilation has receded, totalitarianism seems to be in retreat and there is greater interest in such 
issues as sustainable development, human rights and good governance.  On the other hand, however, 
political and economic instability seem chronic in many regions, and there is a sense of drift both 
within many countries and at the global level.  Prominent on the “new agenda” of world politics is 
the apparent rising tide of communal conflicts around the planet:  a trend which has both positive 
and negative aspects.  Communalism is a threat to both the material and ideational foundations of the 
nation-state, and potentially, to the entire international status quo;  but precisely because communal 
conflicts so often turn violent and have proved resistant to traditional methods of containment and  
resolution, they have stimulated the search for more innovative, more comprehensive, and more fully 
human approaches to dealing with conflict. 
Reconciliation as a technique which goes beyond settling a conflict’s material stakes to 
restoring social relations and healing hearts and minds, has received increasing attention in recent 
years, largely  because of the high profile Truth Commissions  in places like Chile, Argentina, 
Brazil, El Salvador, Haiti and, most prominently, South Africa.1  All of these bodies have proceeded, 
at least nominally, on the premise that shared truth was essential for social reconciliation.  Over 
time, however, it has become increasingly clear that true “national reconciliation” is very 
challenging in countries attempting to make rapid transitions from authoritarian to liberal democratic 
rule.  In most cases, there is a tension, if not a full-blown contradiction, between the officially 
proclaimed need for reconciliation and the capacity of the state to provide justice to the victims of 
past wrongs.  The long term healing, stability and development of many societies may well depend 
on the degree to which this contradiction can, at least to some degree, be resolved. 
In what follows the concept of reconciliation, as developed by Joseph Montville (1998) and 
others, is introduced and its contemporary application in the context of democratizing societies 
examined.  In this regard, the tension between justice and reconciliation, as represented by the 
conditions of amnesty granted in several countries to the perpetrators of human rights abuses, is 
highlighted as a subject of concern in the practice of truth commissions.  In addition, the difficulties 
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of establishing a "national truth” are considered.  Subsequently, the paper considers what measures 
could assist in promoting further national reconciliation, and the emerging consensus about values of 
 a “global civic culture”  is explored as a promising source of more proventive long-term approaches 
to dealing with conflict.  
 
Reconciliation:  the concept and its application 
Violence, perceived injustice and negative stereotyping have combined over extended 
periods of time to render many contemporary conflicts inaccessible to standard non-violent 
resolution processes.  In these situations violence, either latent or manifest, has become the status 
quo and any lasting change can only follow a transformation of the various dynamics underlying that 
status quo.  Reconciliation is promoted by its theorists and practitioners as just such a tool of 
transformation.  There is some breadth of definition of this concept in the literature which the 
following selection of citations tries to capture: 
 
Reconciliation is currently essential to the construction of sustainable peace.  It can 
be defined as a profound process of dialogue between conflicting parties, leading to 
the recognition of the “other” , and respect for his or her differences, interests and 
values (International Year for Reconciliation, 1998b). 
 
Reconciliation is “the action of restoring broken relations”  (International Year for 
Reconciliation, 1998a). 
 
Reconciliation is..."the acknowledgment of the dignity of victims for long ignored.  It 
restores the individual’s capacity to take hold of herself and to manage the future and 
herself in that future.  It restores the capacity to live with or alongside the other.  It 
allows us, while remembering, to bring closure to a chapter in our past.  It enables us 
to live in the present, making our life as a nation and our lives as individuals in a 
shared future.  It always remains a never-ending process" (Commissioner Wynand 
Malan of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, cited in 
“Reconciliation by Understanding,” 1997). 
 
 Montville, who has studied the psychological effects of political violence in some depth, 
explains that those who have suffered unjustified violent attacks have an enduring fear of their 
trauma re-occurring; a fear which undermines the possibility of developing renewed trust in their 
victimizers, and inhibits any true negotiation or eventual (re)integration with them (Montville, 
1998).   Thus, in regard to most communal conflicts time does not “heal all wounds.”  Instead,  
grievances associated with unacknowledged and unforgiven wounds are passed down the 
generations, creating a widening gap of estrangement, fear and hatred, which increases the 
likelihood of  further violent conflict and aggravates its intensity.  Montville (1998) mentions 
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Catholics in Northern Ireland, Anatolian Armenians, European Jews during World War II, 
Palestinian Arabs after 1948, Poles and Ukrainians as examples of peoples for whom “victimhood is 
an integral part of their identity.”  True healing according to Montville can only come through 
reconciliation which involves a sequence of three steps: 
 
1.  Acknowledgment.   When oppressors publicly acknowledge what they have done, 
knowledge becomes, in a sense, truth, and victims are (to some extent) assured that the past 
will not repeat itself.  This in itself is contributes to victims' healing and, thereby, facilitates 
dialogue.  However, as Montville (1998) points out:  “The act of acknowledgment to be 
effective must be complete and detailed.  The victim cannot accept the omission of any 
painful episode of loss by the acknowledging side, otherwise the good faith of the 
acknowledgment will be suspect.”  
 
2.  Contrition.  The next step is to take responsibility for past actions, to express regret, and 
to directly request forgiveness. Again, sincerity, as judged by the victims, is the key to the 
success of this step.   
 
3.  Forgiveness.  The first two steps by the oppressor/aggressor prepare the ground for the 
final psychological step, which is the victim’s voluntary forgiveness of past injuries.  It may 
take time for victims to express their forgiveness, but  true acknowledgment and contrition 
by the other side will in themselves have a positive effect on relations between the parties 
(Montville, 1998). 
 
Montville envisions reconciliation occurring in specially designed “workshop” contexts 
where participants from both sides feel secure, and trained neutral third parties conduct various 
therapeutic exercises such as “walks through history.”  Reported results indicate that this kind of 
intimate, small-scale activity can bring about real transformation in attitudes and relationships 
among former enemies.  However, where aspects of the reconciliation process have been applied at 
the national level to entire societies the results, while positive in certain respects, are on the whole 
more ambiguous.  At present, states trying to get beyond their dark pasts seem to inevitably face a 
cruel short-term tradeoff between reconciliation and justice. 
 
Truth Commissions and Reconciliation 
Truth commissions have emerged in most cases as part of transitions from some form of 
authoritarian government (military or civilian dictatorship, or minority rule) toward a more 
democratic political system in societies often characterized by serious divisions along class or 
communal lines.  Richard Wilson (1998) describes them as “... post-war structures for publicly 
addressing unresolved issues arising from past human rights violations”, which “...typically consist 
of an investigative team with a mandate to take testimonies, corroborate evidence, document human 
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rights abuses and make recommendations regarding structural reforms and reparations.” They have 
been established either through legislation or presidential decree to achieve a defined and delimited 
task, and they are dissolved once they have reported their findings.   
Truth commissions can be seen as important milestones on the road toward democracy.  The 
extensiveness of a commission’s  mandate, the thoroughness of and public support for its inquiries 
and the impact of its report (if any) are all indicators of the relative strength of the new political 
order.  The data on various commissions presented in the Appendix reflects just how diverse 
national experiences with truth commissions, and related bodies, has actually been.  Even a cursory 
comparison of the various cases reveals significant differences in regard to: 
 
Purpose.  Besides exposing the truth of human rights abuses, some seemed intended to show 
the current regime’s immediate predecessors in a bad light (Ethiopia, Haiti) 
 
Time period investigated.  While some commissions investigated periods as brief as 3-4 
years (Haiti), several examined one or more decades of their nation’s history (Chile, 
Germany, and South Africa among others). 
 
Documentation.  Several commissions documented thousands -- and in a few instances tens 
of thousands -- of cases of abuse (Chile) while others found very few (Bolivia). 
 
Reporting.  Some commissions have issued no report (Bolivia, Philippines) or a report which 
was kept confidential (Zimbabwe).  In some cases those responsible for abuses were named 
(El Salvador, Honduras) and in others they were not (Uruguay). 
 
One of the most controversial aspects of truth commissions has been the granting of amnesty. 
 Though amnesty has not occurred in all countries, it has been prominent in just those cases where 
the commissions have been regarded as most thorough in their inquiries.  On balance, it almost 
seems that some sort of amnesty has been a necessary prerequisite for a commission to contribute to 
national reconciliation.  This is exemplified by the Chilean case, where the military under former 
Head of State General Pinochet only accepted the Truth Commission on the condition of amnesty 
and a compromise in which the maximum truth about “disappearances” could be reported but 
judgment on whether the deaths were justified was left to “individual discretion”(Green, 1996).  
Despite these seeming equivocations the Chilean truth commission is assessed by many human 
rights experts as having dealt with past issues in such a way as to contribute to national 
reconciliation (Human Sciences Research Council, 1998). 
 
South Africa:  Both Truth and Reconciliation?  
The variety, and sometimes contradictory, commentary on the work of South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) also reflects ambivalence about the real connection between 
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the commission and national reconciliation.   While the commission was in session an impression 
was created that "wounds of the past" were somehow being healed.  Much of this was, no doubt, due 
to the extensive national and international media coverage of the commission's activities.   Winslow 
(1997) for instance, explains that as a result of being "...deluged with newspaper reports of detailed 
human rights violations on a daily basis.." White South Africans have been forced to face the fact 
that “... old norms, myths and beliefs no longer hold true...” (Winslow, 1997), while for blacks their 
suspicions were validated and elaborated.   Certainly, in the course of its work the Truth 
Commission has provided a context for many individual incidents involving acknowledgment, 
contrition and forgiveness, the three steps in Montville's model of reconciliation. Most importantly 
perhaps is Winslow’s (1997) conviction that the TRC represents a major watershed in South African 
history:  “...because of the TRC, there is no turning back. The nation must now adapt to the new 
norms and realities about its history, restructure its cognitive processes, and move on from the past.”  
Some psychologists have, however, warned against assuming that public “truth telling” leads 
to both individual and national healing: 
There is a popular assumption that the TRC provides the space for a cathartic release 
of emotions that can form the basis for psychological healing - for individual 
deponents and for society as a whole. But this is questionable. Can we talk about 
individual healing in the same breath as national healing? Are the processes different 
or the same? 
If we speak of helping individuals and society to 'heal' we must have at least a 
working definition of the ailment or injury; we must be sure that the 'cure' leaves the 
afflicted individual or society better and not worse off. In attempting to answer this 
question, it is crucial to establish whether there is a valid comparison between the 
cognitive and therapeutic processes that affect the 'society' and the 'individual' (de 
Ridder, 1997). 
 
Furthermore, despite the willingness of many victims to forgive, the granting of amnesty and 
uncertainty over reparation payments are real and potentially explosive issues in South Africa today. 
 Some commentators, while agreeing that amnesty was a necessary and pragmatic compromise to 
permit the TRC to delve into human rights violations,  feel it was not made clear that this was an 
"evil" compromise.  In the worst case, this could contribute to the impression that the TRC has 
favored perpetrators over victims; an impression strengthened "...by the sense that at present it 
appears as though perpetrators have more to gain by receiving amnesty than victims have through 
reparation. Reparation seems distant as it will only occur once the TRC is over and there is no 
guarantee of what form it will take" (Hambler, 1998).  Though the South African case has several 
unique aspects, similar problems exist in other countries trying to make the transition from a closed 
to a more open system of government. 
 
Truth in Transition 
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The possibility that national reconciliation may  be getting higher priority than justice and 
healing for individuals, raises disturbing questions.  What sort of reconciliation is it that leaves many 
personal wounds untreated?  In this regard the expression “forgive and forget” takes on a new and 
perhaps sinister meaning.  While forgiveness is certainly healthy, it is far from clear that a nation 
should ever forget even the most painful aspects of its past.  Writing about the major commissions in 
Latin America, Ignatieff (1996) has argued that “false reconciliation” is a danger worth taking 
seriously: 
 
The record of the truth commissions in Latin America has disillusioned many 
of those who believed that shared truth was a precondition of social reconciliation. 
The military and police apparatus survived the inquisition with their legitimacy 
undermined but their power intact. The societies in question used the truth 
commissions to indulge in the illusion that they had put the past behind them. The 
truth commissions allowed exactly the kind of false reconciliation with the past they 
had been expressly created to forestall.  
The German writer and thinker Theodor Adorno observed this false reconciliation at 
work in his native Germany after the war:   '"Coming to terms with the past" does not 
imply a serious working through of the past, the breaking of its spell through an act 
of clear consciousness. It suggests, rather, wishing to turn the page and, if possible, 
wiping it from memory. The attitude that it would be proper for everything to be 
forgiven and forgotten by those who were wronged is expressed by the party that 
committed the injustice (emphasis added).  
 
 A fuller appreciation of the difficulties of blending principle with pragmatism can be gained 
if one sees truth commissions in the broader context of democratization.  Sørensen (1993), a 
specialist in this field, has written that the most important influence on the outcome of 
democratization in a given country is the nature of the coalition promoting the change.  As he 
(1993:44) explains:  “The crucial distinction is between transitions dominated by the elites who were 
also behind the old, authoritarian regimes [i.e. transitions from ‘above’] , and transitions in which 
mass actors have gained the upper hand [i.e. transitions from ‘below’].”  To date, the majority of 
democratic transitions in countries with truth commissions has clearly been “top down.”   They have 
most often been precipitated by a crisis in the previous authoritarian government, in response to 
which the ruling coalition divided into those wanting to continue the old style of rule despite the 
crisis, and those who felt a process of democratization could bring such benefits as renewed 
legitimacy (both at home and abroad) or more international investment.  In this scenario at least 
some old elites remain in positions of power and they will only accept institutional arrangements 
which do not adversely affect their interests to any significant degree.  Sørensen (1993:47), in fact,  
argues that this type of transition can result in the creation of “restricted democracy” characterized 
by: 
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...the presence of elite groups whose members reserve the right to interfere in the 
democratic process in order to protect their interests.  In the case of democratic 
transitions from above, such interference can be part of the actual basis of the whole 
movement toward democracy.  In other words, the elite groups (the military, 
traditional economic elites, and leading politicians) may make the transition toward 
democracy dependent on the acceptance of a set of agreements, or political pacts, 
that define vital areas of interest for the elites. (emphasis in original).  
 
He also sheds light on the amnesty issue discussed above, citing the case of Argentina where the 
new democratic government under Raúl Alfonsin tried to bring the military to account for its past 
actions before a court.  Unfortunately, this was more than the military would accept, and in the wake 
of the military rebellions of 1987 Alfonsin had to stop most efforts to try military officers (Sørensen, 
1993:  49-50). 
Karl, writing primarily about Latin America, argues in a similar vein that any democratic 
transition based on a “foundational pact” between the government and the opposition is to some 
degree problematic since the pact  inevitably restricts representation in the new system to protect the 
position of the dominant classes.   In the final analysis, he (1990: 11-12) characterizes these pacts as: 
 “...anti-democratic mechanisms, bargained by elites, which seek to create a deliberate 
socioeconomic and political contract that demobilises emerging mass actors while delineating the 
extent to which all actors can participate or wield power in the future.” Commenting on Karl’s 
judgment, Pinkney (1993) (summarizes the positive and negative aspects of this path to 
democratization.  He (1993: 142) explains that precisely because of the concessions made: 
“...transition by pact scores highly in terms of consensus, at least at the elite level, and stability, but 
poorly in terms of the prospects for equality and mass participation, and leaves a built-in elite veto in 
place.” However, one should not conclude that the new system is only different in form, rather than 
substance, from the old.  Rather, in the new democracy there will most likely be an end to arbitrary 
arrest, torture and execution; there may be more freedom for trade unions; and, perhaps most 
important over the long term, the electorate acquires the power to remove unacceptable leaders 
(Pinkney, 1993). 
 This assessment suggests another question:  truth commissions are based on the premise that 
there is one truth, but how realistic is this assumption during a top-down transition?  Post-modernist 
critique has made us aware that social truth is always contested, and in a “dirty war” all sides have 
their versions of the truth.  Where truth commissions have not been allowed to fix blame for the acts 
they document, the “truth” of the security forces--  i.e. that they were engaged in putting down 
insurgencies--cannot be refuted.  Besides different versions of the truth, there are also different 
dimensions of truth: “ One should distinguish between factual truth and moral truth, between 
narratives that tell what happened and narratives that attempt to explain why things happened and 
who is responsible.  The truth commissions had more success in establishing the first than in 
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promoting the second” (Ignatieff, 1996).   Ignatieff (1996) in fact suggests that for communal 
conflicts, the past cannot be exposed and reified once for all; rather:  “The past is an argument and 
the function of truth commissions, like the function of honest historians, is simply to purify the 
argument, to narrow the range of permissible lies.”  
 
Guatemala:  “top down” and “bottom up” truths 
The case of Guatemala further highlights several of these points.  The various accords and 
commissions tasked with looking into human rights abuses in that country have been far from 
completely satisfactory, and the most significant of these, the Commission for Historical 
Clarification (CEH)2, was clearly limited by the realities of a war-torn society and a transitional 
state. Wilson lists five clauses of the accord creating the CEH which he feels “...undermine its 
potential for challenging impunity and promoting the rule of law” (Wilson, 1998): 
 
(1)  the stipulation that only abuses “linked to the armed conflict” should be investigated, 
which means that illegal acts against those not connected to either side could be considered 
outside the brief of the Commission; 
(2) the Commission’s existence was limited to six months, which is an impossibly short time 
to investigate several decades of events; 
(3) the Commission was charged with making “objective judgements about events during the 
period under consideration”, which is understood to mean that the security forces and the 
rebels should be held equally responsible for violence; 
(4) the Commission was extremely weak, having no powers (in contrast to the TRC in South 
Africa) of search, seizure or subpoena; and 
(5) the Commission “will not individualise responsibility, nor have any legal implications” 
which means that no names would be included in the Commission’s report and no 
Commission findings could be used in later legal proceedings. 
 
The Commission was further hobbled by a serious lack of funds.  The government had initially 
intended to allocate only $50,000 to the Commission, but under pressure the figure was increased to 
$800,000.  However, the Commission’s Head, German law professor Christian Tomuschat, was 
obliged to delay the Commission’s work until he could find substantial international financial 
backing (Hegstrom, 1997).  Also, though a “Comprehensive Accord on Human Rights” had been 
concluded in 1994 which contained strong anti-impunity provisions, in 1996 rebels and government 
negotiators agreed on amnesty terms which came into effect in 1997 in the, ironically titled, “Law of 
National Reconciliation.”  
Several civil society organizations have participated in the work of revealing the truth in 
Guatemala, and most prominent among these was the Catholic Archbishop’s Human Rights Office 
(ODHA) which carried out the “Recovery of Historical Memory” (REMHI) project.  The REMHI 
project’s report, entitled “Guatemala:  Never Again” and completed in April 1998, documented more 
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than 55,000 documented human rights violations, and it claims that during the period under study:  
“...150,000 people died, 50,000 ‘disappeared,’ one million became refugees, 200,000 children were 
orphaned and 40,000 women became widows” (A War Called Peace:  Images of Guatemala, 1998).  
Most importantly, the REMHI project named both perpetrators and victims on both sides of the civil 
war.  Thus, it has both complemented the CEH and served to further highlight its shortcomings 
(Wilson, 1998).  The gap between the “truth” of the officially sanctioned commission, and that of 
this more extensive civil society initiative was dramatically demonstrated by the murder of  
Monsignor Juan Gerardi Conedera.  Gerardi, bishop of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, was the 
Coordinator of the ODHA and the driving force behind the REMHI; and just two days before his 
death he participated in the presentation of REMHI’s final report.  Though government officials call 
the killing a common crime, human rights activists see it as a reprisal for demands made at the 
presentation ceremony for justice based on the report’s findings.  It also seemed to confirm popular 
suspicions that, despite government denials, death squads continue to operate in the country (A War 
Called Peace, 1998). 
The Guatemalan context was also shaped by a United Nations human rights presence, which 
made several important contributions to improving the human rights climate during the transition 
from military rule.  However, as the transition advanced some commentators felt there was tension 
between the U.N.’s role in promoting human rights and its role as mediator and verifier of the 
Guatemalan peace accords.  Thus, in April 1998 the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
ended its probe into human rights abuses, despite widespread objections from various humanitarian 
organizations.  This decision gave rise to speculation that the U.N. was so concerned with validating 
the transition to democracy that it was willing to make concessions on human rights issues.  The 
effects of the decision are potentially far reaching, since in its wake the Guatemalan armed forces 
can once again buy weapons internationally and receive foreign military assistance (Zubieta, 1998).  
Finally, it should be noted that the murder of Archbishop Gerardi did not cause the United Nations 
to alter its judgment. 
 
An Alternative to Courts 
Though truth commissions very likely promise more than they can deliver, what they can 
deliver, as described above by Pinkney, is very  significant.  This is further illustrated by considering 
the differences between truth commissions and courts.  It must be remembered that commissions are 
instituted in countries where the legal system had been, one way or another, perverted in such a way 
as to permit human rights abuses to occur, and even be “justified.”  The new order emerging out of a 
“top down” transition simply does not have, as clearly demonstrated by the Argentine case, the 
institutional capacity to right the wrongs of the past through the rule of law.  Truth commissions 
represent, therefore, an imperfect but politically viable alternative way for a people to raise and 
examine at least some of the shortcomings in the human rights practice of their legal systems and 
security forces.  Commenting on his country’s experience, South African lawyer Richard  Penwill 
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(1997) argues that the difference between the TRC and a court is, in many ways, the key to its 
success: 
 
The TRC is not, and was not intended to be, a court of law. It was not created to 
make a judgment; it was created to help ventilate the evidence, establish the truth and 
bring about reconciliation. Unlike a court it does not aim at a conclusion so much as 
a process....Ironically it is these non court-like characteristics that have enabled us, 
the general public, to hear a wide ambit of evidence which has raised questions about 
the role of the courts, police and instruments of law and order and justice in our 
society.  
 
Penwill goes on to illustrate this point using the example of TRC testimony in which a policeman 
confirmed the past use of the infamous “wet bag” torture by demonstrating how it was applied.  This 
technique had been used frequently to illegally extract confessions which led to convictions of  
people for serious offenses they did not commit.  Though the defendants regularly claimed that their 
confessions had been obtained under duress, there was no corroboration and the courts were obliged 
to accept the confessions as evidence (Penwill, 1997).  Now all of South Africa has proof of the 
“justice” system being used for injustice and oppression, and by implication, everyone has seen the 
need for a new legal order which clearly distinguishes itself from past practice.  Again, commissions 
cannot themselves reform institutions, but they can help create a climate in which true reform may 
become possible.   
Furthermore, truth commissions seem to have contributed more, to date, to national 
reconciliation than war crimes tribunals.   It is often argued that the two recent war crimes tribunals, 
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, have proved too slow in their operations to meet the 
demands of justice, and that they lack the means to ensure that many known criminals stand trial.  
Writing about the Great Lakes region of Africa, Vandeginste (1998) explains that:   
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was set up not only to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law between 1 January and 31 December 1994 but with the belief that prosecutions 
‘will contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace.’  
However, he concluded (in 1997) that :  “Three and a half years later, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that the ICTR will not be able to contribute significantly to national reconciliation” 
(Vandeginste, 1998).  The Guatemalan experience also seems to confirm the view that formal justice 
procedures are too slow and politically charged, and as Wilson (1998) explains:  
 
...a maximalist ‘Nuremberg option’ for addressing war crimes is not even remotely 
possible in Guatemala.  This is not to say that the legal route to justice should be 
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abandoned altogether...What is essential is that the limitations of the legal system be 
recognised so that the Commission and other initiatives can complement its work. 
 
This overview of contemporary truth commissions as efforts at national reconciliation 
permits a few concluding observations.  First, it seems clear that an effort at national reconciliation 
cannot be limited to Montville’s (1998) three steps of acknowledgment, contrition and forgiveness.  
Rather, justice has to figure into the process somewhere.  However, it is precisely the inability of 
transitional democratic institutions to provide justice that constitutes the most compelling rationale 
for truth commissions.  This suggests that the long term constructive influence of truth commissions 
is their role as a bridge from a past where justice was denied and a present where it is not yet 
practically and politically possible, to a future where it can, in all its dimensions, become an integral 
part of the social order.  In that sense, a process of national reconciliation must go beyond coming to 
terms with the past to seeking out and implementing more broadly equitable models of governance. 
 
Towards a New Political Culture 
           Several analysts have argued that national reconciliation, whether through Truth 
Commissions or other means, is neither a complete approach to conflict transformation nor an 
adequate end in itself.  Galtung (1998)writes, for instance, that what he calls the “three’s” -- 
resolution, reconstruction and reconciliation -- are all essential to stabilization and progress in post-
conflict situations, and omitting any one will undermine efforts to achieve the other two. In a similar 
vein,  Øberg (1996) describes post-conflict “reconstruction” as involving the reconstruction of “...1) 
human beings, soul and bodies, 2) social structure, 3) culture, 4) environment, and 5) a peace culture 
of reconciliation, repentance, forgiveness, respect...and simultaneously moving toward a vision of 
peaceful coexistence...”  In contrast to such a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution, Øberg 
(1996) mentions the Dayton agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina which, though stopping military 
activity, does not solve any of the underlying conflicts in the area.  Clements (1997) suggests that 
the keys to “..development of more stable peaceful relationships between people lie in a deepening 
awareness of the key psychological, social and political processes which generate trusting 
communities within which individuals can realize their deepest sense of self.”  These are important 
insights: it is increasingly obvious that the real challenge in most countries attempting reconciliation 
is to build a society which is truly participatory and fulfilling for all groups.  Otherwise, fissures 
giving rise to alienation and deep-seated conflict will emerge in the new order as they did in the old, 
eventually necessitating further efforts at reconciliation ─ efforts which would certainly be greeted 
with more cynicism than enthusiasm. 
In this regard,  Burton’s work on  human needs provides a useful benchmark against which 
plans for “post-conflict” society can be measured.  Burton (1990: 23) starts from the premise  “...that 
there are limits to the extent to which the human person, acting separately or within a wider ethnic or 
national community, can be socialized or manipulated...”; and “...that there are human development 
needs that must be satisfied and catered for by institutions, if these institutions are to be stable, and if 
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societies are to be significantly free of conflict.”  While acknowledging that this is still a new and 
contested research area, Burton presents a plausible list of needs.  First, human beings require a 
sense of security and of identity. Second, since people have a generic drive to learn, they require a 
consistent response from the environment, without which learning is impossible. Third,  from their 
social context people require both recognition and valued relationships, or bonding .  Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly,  individuals require (some) control over their environments in order to 
insure that their needs are fulfilled (Burton, 1990: 47 and 95).  This approach has important 
implications for social institutions.  If, on balance, needs are being met within an institution, the 
institution receives support and is consolidated and perpetuated.  If, however, needs are not met, the 
institution loses support and legitimacy, and confronts increasing opposition.  In the latter case, 
authorities tend to react with repression and coercion, but if an institution  is “de-legitimated” for 
enough people, conflict can not be resolved this way.  Rather, the institutional structures have to 
evolve, sooner or later, to more fully accommodate the needs of the people they affect.   
To Burton (1990: 127), legitimacy is a dynamic, rather than a static, condition which 
“stresses the reciprocal nature of relations with authorities, the support given because of the services 
they render, and respect for legal norms when these are legitimized norms.”  He (1990: 127) 
contrasts this with a static notion of  legality which “...has associated with it...loyalty to a sovereign 
or formal leader right or wrong, elitism, the common good and the national interest as interpreted by 
elites...”  From this perspective, national reconciliation would not be complete until the social and 
political order was popularly perceived as legitimate.  Though such legitimacy is currently  
considered to inhere in liberal democratic institutions,  Burton (1998: 4) has recently argued that 
conventional representative democracy is only effective in a society with “...relative ethnic 
homogeneity, classlessness and equality...”; and this model alone is not able to guarantee 
institutional legitimacy  “...in a society that contains major income differences, and in which 
minorities are unrepresented but must observe the norms of a majority”-- conditions characteristic of 
many transitional countries.   In summary, Burton’s work indicates that social reform which goes 
further than conventional Western models of governance to meet human needs is necessary if the 
deep-seated conflicts of war-torn societies are ever to be transformed into peaceful and creative 
relations among the groups concerned. 
There is, in fact, a widening consensus among human needs theorists, human rights 
advocates, international organizations concerned with development and peace researchers about the 
requisite qualities of such a new social order.  Consider the United Nations Development Program’s 
(UNDP) “five aspects of sustainable development”3 
 
  Empowerment - The expansion of men and women’s capabilities and choices increases their 
ability to exercise those choices free of hunger, want and deprivation.  It also increases their 
opportunity to participate in, or endorse, decision-making affecting their lives. 
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  Co-operation - With a sense of belonging important for personal fulfillment, well-being and 
a sense of purpose and meaning, human development is concerned with the ways in which 
people work together and interact. 
  Equity -  The expansion of capabilities and opportunities means more than income BB it also 
means equity, such as an educational system to which everybody should have access. 
 
  Sustainability - The needs of this generation must be met without compromising the right of 
future generations to be free of poverty and deprivation and to exercise their basic 
capabilities. 
 
  Security - Particularly the security of livelihood.  People need to be freed from threats, such 
as disease or repression and from sudden harmful disruption in their lives (United Nations 
Development Programme, 1997). 
 
These characteristics closely resemble Burton’s needs.  In a similar vein, the UNDP goes on to 
outline the elements of a governance system which would promote sustainable development, 
suggesting that sustainable development can only be realized through political institutions which 
function according to similar principles (UNDP, 1997).   
The convergence evident here parallels recent advances in the theory and practice of human 
rights.  The Cold War division between the Capitalist camp’s emphasis on civil and political rights 
and the Socialist/Third World preference for social, economic and cultural rights has now been 
recognized as unhelpful and unacceptable.  All five major areas of human rights have been 
acknowledged by the international community  (however grudgingly in some cases) as an indivisible 
whole.  However, as indicated above, rights and the improved quality of individual and collective 
life they represent can not simply be legislated into existence; an understanding reflected in the 
emphasis by many activists and organizations on a “cultural” approach to the problem.  Consider the 
following sample of such initiatives: 
 
1.  The United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO), and 
others, are promoting a “Culture of Peace” defined as: “...a set of values, attitudes and 
behaviours which reflect and inspire participatory democracy, social interaction, sharing, 
tolerance, gender equity, solidarity, human rights, the rejection of violence and conflict 
prevention through dialogue” (UNESCO, 1996). 
 
2.  A group of Nobel Laureates is promoting a “Culture of Non-violence”, which would 
encompass love, justice, harmony; reject oppression; and embrace social diversity, non-
violence and personal transformation (Decade for a Culture of Non-Violence, 1998). 
 
15 
Charles O. Lerche III 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. A former United Nations Secretary General promoted the creation of a “universal culture 
of human rights” (United Nations Secretary General, 1989). 
 
4.  The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance promotes a “Culture of 
Democracy”, which highlights nonviolent conflict resolution, open decision-making, the role 
of civil society, transparency and participation (International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, 1998a). 
 
Finally, the World Commission on Culture and Development draws some far-reaching conclusions 
from this burgeoning consensus.  They believe it provides strong evidence that there is a discernible 
“global civic culture” from which important elements of global ethics can be derived (World 
Commission on Culture and Development, 1996).   These “global ethics” are: 
 
general principles denoting the fundamental moral concern that in a social and 
political community ought to find adequate reflection....the basic moral concern -- to 
protect the integrity and to respect the vulnerability of human beings -- is universal 
in its appeal and can be shown to be part of all major traditions of moral teaching... 
 
In their own formulation, they put forth five principle ideas that should form the core of global 
ethics: 
 
Human rights and responsibilities  
Democracy and the development of civil society 
Protection of minorities 
Peaceful conflict resolution 
Equity within and between generations 
 
These principles, like those cited earlier, reject elitism and give priority to participation in all 
institutions and social programs.  Furthermore, they argue that states, though historically the worst 
violators of these principles, are now under increasing pressure from global civil society and 
international organizations to conform to standards of global ethics both domestically and in 
international relations.  Only then can the dominant pattern of conflict and power politics be 
replaced by something else. 
Returning once more to the Guatemalan case, it is quite clear that such principles figured 
prominently in the peace accords that brought the armed struggle to a definitive conclusion.  As 
Palencia Prado (1998) has explained: 
 
The central concerns of the peace accords include the need to transform existing 
relations between state and society, so that political institutions are capable, for the 
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first time, of mediating the interests of all social groups in a poor, unequal, multi-
ethnic, and multilingual Guatemala.  To achieve this transformation, core provisions 
express time and again the need for participative consultation in the formulation, 
execution, evaluation and monitoring of state policies, and for accountability in 
legislative action and executive decision-making.  In other words a culture of 
involvement in which public decision-making responds to the will of the citizenry is 
clearly promoted in the accords...(emphasis added). 
  
The author goes on, however, to catalogue a number of ways in which political life in the new 
Guatemala either falls short of the ideals embodied in the accords or diverts from them completely.  
Though the country now has  more democratic institutions, a better organized and more extensive 
civil society and distinct support for human rights from the international community, it is clear that a 
complete culture change in the direction of what she calls involvement remains a long-term goal 
demanding unrelenting effort.  However, as argued below, Burton's work indicates that nothing short 
of such an effort can bring stable and creative social  peace to this or any other country in transition. 
 
Conclusion 
Burton has emphasized that there are two fundamentally different approaches to the analysis 
of conflict:  either conflict is due to inherent human aggressiveness and can, at best, be controlled, 
or, as outlined above, it results from inappropriate social institutions that frustrate human needs.  The 
former position justifies coercion and elite control in society, but the latter points out a direction for 
positive change (Burton, 1998: 1).  His analysis is compelling for the countries considered in this 
paper since their historic turning points have been reached through the collapse of overtly coercive 
systems.  This fact, in itself, lends prima facie support to Burton's second premise.  Further support 
is provided by the broad consensus about what values a truly peaceful and democratic society should 
uphold:  a consensus in fact sanctioned by state representatives in the Vienna Declaration on Human 
Rights in 1993 (Human Rights Internet, 1999). 
Truth commissions can be points of departure for a process of transformation towards a civic 
culture which would fulfill rather than frustrate human needs; but they are not enough in themselves. 
 The ambiguities surrounding these commissions and the problems of contemporary political 
development in countries where national reconciliation has been attempted, indicate that far-
reaching challenges are still to be met before successor institutions in transitional societies acquire 
long term legitimacy.    For instance, even assuming good will on the part of leadership, mounting 
evidence indicates that the pace and scope of contemporary economic globalization imposes policy 
choices that sow seeds of further disruptive conflict in transitional societies.4  
 Ultimately, the fate of transitions, whether incorporating formal truth commissions or not, 
may hinge on the degree to which they avoid what Galtung (1995: 12) calls the "one mistake which 
is no longer pardonable:   the single-shot 'table at the top', the high table, for the 'leaders.' "  He 
(Galtung, 1995) goes on to promote another model: " Let one thousand conferences blossom... Tap 
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the insights all over, marginalizing nobody, making peace-making itself a model of structural peace" 
(emphasis added). Thus, if the proliferating institutions of civil society can continue to define and 
focus attention on needs-related issues, such as human rights and sustainable development, and hold 
public institutions accountable for steady progress in these areas, it may be possible to gradually 
complement the original "top down" pact which launched transition with a longer term "bottom up" 
dynamic of social change.  
 
   
Notes 
 
1  Houston Chronicle reporter Tony Freemantle (1997) wrote that as of 1996:  “some kind of 
truth commission charged with investigating past violations of human rights has been used in at least 
14 countries.” 
2  The commission’s full name is:  The Commission for the Historical Clarification of the 
Violations of Human Rights and Acts of Violence which have Causes Suffering to the Guatemalan 
Population. 
3  The UNDP defines sustainable development as: 
…expanding the choices for all people in society.  This means that men and women – particularly 
the poor and vulnerable – are at the centre of the development process.  It also means ‘protection of 
the life opportunities of future generations… and…the natural systems on which all life depends.’ 
(UNDP, Human Development Report 1996).  This makes the central purpose of development the 
creation of an enabling environment in which all can enjoy long, healthy and creative lives (UNDP, 
1997). 
4  Malcolm Waters (1995: 46) has argued, for instance, that the intra-national and 
transnational conflicts generated directly and indirectly by globalization may prove to be “…more 
intractable than the previous disputes between nations.” 
 
Appendix 
 
Examples of Official Commissions of Inquiry 1971 –– 1995  
 
Country 
 
Year 
 
Commission 
 
Result 
 
Bangladesh 
 
1971 
 
Commission on war crimes 
 
30,000 charged after 1971; 
general amnesty 1973 
 
Uganda 
 
1974 
 
Commission of inquiry into 
disappearances 
 
1,000 page report published, but 
no details on individual cases 
 
Brazil 
 
1992 
 
Human rights council Said 111 detainees in Sao Paolo 
wilfully killed by military 
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Country 
 
Year 
 
Commission 
 
Result 
police, 1992 
 
Mexico 
 
1992 
 
National human rights 
commission 
 
Reported on various 
disappearances 
 
Nicaragua 
 
1992 
 
Tripartite commission 
 
Reported deaths of ten members 
of former opposition 
 
Togo 
 
1992 
 
National human rights 
commission 
 
Said government forces 
responsible for 1991 killings 
 
Niger 
 
1992-
1993 
 
Human rights commission of 
the national conference 
 
Only some corruption cases 
investigated 
 
Ethiopia 
 
1992 
 
Special public prosecutor 
 
Dozens of perpetrators charged 
in early 1995 
 
Sudan 
 
1992-
1994 
 
Commission of inquiry into 
government violence 
(Previous regime) 
 
Report on incidents in Juba to be 
published 
 
Thailand 
 
1992 
 
Ministry of Defense inquiry 
into killings and 
disappearances during 
demonstrations in May 1992 
 
Report not made public 
 
El Salvador 
 
1993-
1994 
 
Joint investigation 
committee on illegal armed 
groups 
 
Reported many killings had  
political background; 
perpetrators mentioned in 
confidential appendix 
 
Zimbabwe 
 
1993 
 
Human rights commission to 
investigate violations under 
present and previous 
governments 
 
In progress 
 
Ghana 
 
 1993-
1994 
 
Commission on human 
rights and administrative 
justice 
 
Failed investigation into killings 
of early 1980s 
 
Burundi 
 
1993 
 
Commission to investigate Commission apparently never 
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Country 
 
Year 
 
Commission 
 
Result 
killings in coup attempt  
1993 
started work 
 
Honduras 
 
1993 
 
National commissioner for 
the protection of human 
rights 
 
Report named those responsible 
for 1984 disappearances 
 
Malawi  
 
1994 
 
Commission of inquiry into 
political killings of early 
1980s 
 
In progress 
 
Sri Lanka 
 
1994 
 
Three commissions to 
investigate killings and 
disappearances since 1988 
 
In progress 
 
South 
Africa 
 
1995 
 
Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
 
Investigation of 30 years of 
apartheid regime violence and 
counter-violence.  Report 
published 1998 
 
Guatemala 
 
1995 
 
Commission of elucidation 
 
Investigated human rights 
violations and acts of violence 
 
Bolivia 
 
1982 
 
Commission of inquiry into 
disappearances 
 
No report 
 
Israel 
 
1982-
1983 
 
Commission of inquiry into 
killings in Sabra and Chatila 
 
Report said no direct 
responsibility but urged 
measures against certain 
officials 
 
Argentina 
 
1983-
1985 
 
Commission on the 
disappearance of persons 
(Sabato Commission) 
 
Nunca Mas report documented 
nearly 9,000 disappeared, 
analyzed repression apparatus 
 
Guinea 
 
1985 
 
Commission of inquiry 
 
No report 
 
Uruguay 
 
1985 
 
Parliamentary investigative 
commission on 'disappeared' 
persons 
 
Report published, no details of 
individual cases 
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Country 
 
Year 
 
Commission 
 
Result 
Zimbabwe 1985 Commission of inquiry into 
Matabele land murders by 
North Korean 5th Brigade 
during early years of Pres. 
Mugabe's rule 
Report kept confidential, amidst 
churches' and public's demand 
for its release 
 
Philippines 
 
1986-
1987 
 
Presidential committee on 
human rights 
 
Report not completed 
 
Chile 
 
1990-
1991 
 
National commission on 
truth and reconciliation 
 
Extensive report documented 
2,100 cases, analysed repression 
apparatus, many 
recommendations for reparation 
and rehabilitation 
 
Chad 
 
1991-
1992 
 
Commission of inquiry on 
crimes by ex-president 
Habre and others 
 
Report said 40,000 were killed, 
details on 4,000 cases named 
perpetrators 
 
Czech 
Republic 
 
1991 
 
Parliamentary commission 
on lustration law 
 
Some 200,000 individuals asked 
for certificate of clean record 
 
Sri Lanka 
 
1991 
 
Presidential commission of 
inquiry 
 
No report published 
 
Germany 
 
1992, 
1995 
 
Parliamentary commissions 
of inquiry to study effects of 
communist party, ideology 
and security apparatus 
 
Analytical history of 150,000 
pages, files opened for 
individual requests 
 
Poland 
 
1992 
 
Inquiry by the Ministry of 
the Interior 
 
Secret list of 64 names leaked to 
press, then discredited 
 
Bulgaria 
 
1992 
 
Temporary commission of 
inquiry on the Communist 
Party 
 
No report 
 
Romania 
 
1992 
 
Parliamentary commission of 
inquiry 
 
Two reports published 
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Country 
 
Year 
 
Commission 
 
Result 
Albania 1992 Commission on killings by 
security apparatus in 
Shkoder 1944-1991 
Six mass graves discovered, 
2,000 victims reported 
 
Chile 
 
1992 
 
National corporation for 
reparation and rehabilitation 
 
Ongoing investigation into 
killings and disappearances 
 
El Salvador 
 
1992 
 
Ad hoc commission on the 
military 
 
Confidential report 
recommended dismissal of 100 
military officers for human 
rights violations 
 
El Salvador 
 
1992-
1993 
 
UN Commission of truth 
 
Report said 60,900 killed, of 
which 5% by opposition; named 
perpetrators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Human Sciences Research Council, 
http://www.hsrc.ac.za/corporate/InFocus/May98/truthcomm.htm. 
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CEASEFIRE: THE IMPACT OF REPUBLICAN POLITICAL CULTURE 
ON THE CEASEFIRE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
Montgomery Sapone 
 
On August 31, 1994, the Provisional IRA (PIRA) declared a cessation of military operations. 
 For the past thirty years, the conflict in Northern Ireland has been raging almost without pause.1 
British security forces have attempted to control the violence by establishing road blocks, 
conducting house searches, altering the judicial system to allow conviction on informant testimony, 
instituting internment without trial for paramilitary suspects, garrisoning over thirty thousand British 
soldiers in Northern Ireland, instituting broadcasting bans of Sinn Féin, and conducting intensive 
interrogation of suspects. Despite the best attempts of the British government over the past few 
decades to thwart PIRA, the conflict persisted.  To sustain a low-intensity war under these 
conditions requires more than guns and ammunition; it requires the support of a political community, 
extensive organization of economic resources, and cultural values that give meaning to the conflict.  
The duration of the conflict in Northern Ireland cannot be understood without reference to 
Irish Republican culture and history.  Similarly, the ceasefire itself must be viewed in light of the 
history and culture of Irish Republicanism.  PIRA's refusal, for example, to decommission weapons 
or to declare a "permanent" ceasefire as a precondition to entering into negotiations is generally seen 
by observers as a purely utilitarian strategic decision.  After all, handing over guns with no guarantee 
that what is negotiated will actually be given creates unnecessary vulnerability.  But behind the 
refusal to decommission weapons is not just a utilitarian political strategy, but a set of cultural 
values. 
This paper begins with a discussion of the cultural forces that sustained the conflict. In 
addition to the considerable impact of cultural forces, British security policy contributed to the 
longevity of the conflict.  Similarly, the antithetical political positions of the major players in the 
conflict (British, Republican, Loyalist and Irish Republic) prevented any easy settlement.2  This 
paper describes how the low-intensity, military sustainablity and cultural entrenchment of the 
conflict resulted in a stalemate between PIRA and the British Army.  Noting that the ambivalence of 
a military stalemate has consequences for a ceasefire process, this paper reviews the political and 
military events during the ceasefire and then argues that the major stumbling blocks during the 
ceasefire process were not simply logistical, but deeply connected to the culture of Irish 
Republicanism.   
 
Sustaining Perpetual Low-Intensity Conflict 
The conflict in Northern Ireland is one of the longest running low-intensity conflicts of the 
twentieth century.  The continuity of the violence has confounded academic commentators and 
military analysts alike.  In the thousands of books that have been published concerning the conflict 
in Northern Ireland, explanations ranging from religious hatred to material gain have been advanced 
to account for the longevity of the conflict and the intractability of the parties in negotiating a 
settlement.3  But the key to the continuity of the conflict is neither economic nor sectarian, but 
cultural.  Ephemeral cultural values have allowed the Republican community to continue fighting for 
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British withdrawal and the reunification of Ireland against one of the most sophisticated military 
organizations in the world for thirty years.4 
The core political belief of Republicans in Northern Ireland, including Sinn Féin and the 
Provisional IRA, is that the 1921 partition of Ireland and continued British rule in Northern Ireland 
are illegitimate.5  Republicans view the British government as the source of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland.  According to Gerry Adams (1995: 61), President of Sinn Féin, "violence in Ireland has its 
roots in the conquest of Ireland by Britain." Republicans do not see their own violence as the cause 
of continued British military presence in Northern Ireland, but as a reaction to it.  They believe they 
are engaged in armed opposition against British colonialism.  Therefore, any settlement that does not 
guarantee the withdrawal of the British from Ireland is de facto inadequate. 
The social environment in which Republicans in Northern Ireland live only reinforces their 
perception of the British as the enemy and their armed struggle as necessary and just.  The poverty, 
discrimination, social isolation and unemployment which Catholics in Northern Ireland experienced 
as a minority in a Protestant-majority state reinforced their perception of themselves as victims of a 
repressive colonial regime. In the Republican communities of Northern Ireland, most families have 
relatives or friends who have been killed by security forces or imprisoned for paramilitary activity.  
The impression of Republicans that the British were determined to destroy the Irish culture and deny 
them self-determination was confirmed by the constant, hostile presence of British armored vehicles 
and patrolling soldiers. For Republicans, these conditions amounted to a state of social and 
psychological siege. 
For Republicans, armed struggle against British military occupation is unquestionably 
necessary, effective and legitimate (Irvin 1999). The political history of Ireland provides adequate 
evidence of the effectiveness of armed struggle as a means of creating political change.  Without the 
historic efforts of the IRA and their forebearers against the British colonization of Ireland, the 
Republic of Ireland would not exist today.  It is an impossible task to convince Republicans that 
change is possible through the democratic process alone -- their history instructs otherwise. And this 
history is a living fact that is, for Republicans, constantly present.  Indeed, the historical deeds of 
grandfathers and great-grandfathers who fought against British occupation during the 1916 Uprising 
and the Anglo-Irish war often recounted with pride.   
Another indication of the unchallenged legitimacy of armed struggle within the Republican 
community is that the IRA has never suffered from a paucity of volunteers.  While it may seem 
incomprehensible that Provisional IRA volunteers chose to engage in military activities likely to 
result in death or imprisonment, to them the choice appears not only necessary but desirable.  Status 
in this community is correlated with military competence.  Bearing arms in the pursuit of Irish 
autonomy is considered to be the ultimate expression of Republicanism. 
Like most cultures where violence is a fact of daily life, Republicans in Northern Ireland 
have successfully adapted to the misfortune by transforming the tragedy of violent death into 
communal benefit.  The spectacular funerals of slain IRA volunteers, the treatment of the 1981 
hungerstrikers as martyrs, and the murals glorifying the Republican dead all testify to the capacity of 
Republicans to derive cultural value from politically motivated deaths.  Violent death is seen not just 
as a necessity of the armed struggle against the British, but as a sacrifice which only serves to make 
the culture stronger.  Although Republican culture could be negatively described as "necrophilic," 
  
the sanctification of violent death is a highly adaptive cultural practice within a militarized 
environment.6 
In addition to cultural factors that perpetuated the conflict, British political and military 
policy have, perhaps inadvertently, contributed to its longevity.  The British Army entered Northern 
Ireland in 1969 in order to conduct peacekeeping operations.  Although the British Army was 
initially deployed to put a stop to Loyalist rioting in which the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 
were colluding, the violence quickly escalated.  Under the command of Lieutenant-General Tuzo, 
the Army conducted a number of large-scale military operations, such as the internment of suspects, 
the re-taking of urban territory (Operation Motorman), and use of unnecessary extreme force (e.g., 
"Bloody Sunday" in 1972).7  The situation in Northern Ireland certainly looked like war; IRA 
prisoners were even accorded a de facto POW status by the British government. 
Because this military approach to dealing with the IRA unintentionally legitimated PIRA as a 
belligerent, security policy was reevaluated in the 1980's.  Alternative methods of containing the 
violence were sought.  New British security policy emphasized normalization, Ulsterization and 
criminalization in order to limit the overall level of violence (Bew and Patterson 1985).  During this 
period, attempts were made to contain the conflict geographically within Northern Ireland through 
exclusion orders, road blocks, and extradition.  The conflict was "normalized" by creating a cordon 
sanitaire around Belfast City Center, by instituting police primacy, and undertaking by sophisticated 
public relations campaigns.  Convicted PIRA members, as well as Loyalist paramilitaries, were 
treated as criminals ("terrorists") rather than as political prisoners.  PIRA's attempts during the late 
1970's to escalate the war by attacking "big targets" (helicopters, NATO bases, Mountbatten's yacht) 
and the 1981 hungerstrike, which sought to regain prisoner-of-war status for paramilitary prisoners, 
were responses to the criminalization program  (Feldman 1991). 
Although British security policy prevented escalation of the violence, it ironically also 
prevented any purely military solution. British commanders often asserted that, if law and public 
policy allowed them to do so, they could defeat PIRA militarily. However, legal restrictions on the 
use of force (e.g., rules of engagement, emergency legislation, and international instruments) 
prevented the British Army from taking aggressive military actions that would have routed the IRA. 
 The status of the armed conflict as an emergency action with troop deployment authorized under the 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions Act) as military aid to the civil power rather than a war 
powers act, imposed a doctrine of minimum force.  Soldiers issued with a yellow card containing the 
rules of engagement were allowed to fire only in life-threatening circumstances (Dewar 1985: 58-
59). Furthermore, as the ostensible upholders of law and order, they could not be seen to act outside 
of the law.  The British Army essentially tied its own hands with the security policy it adopted.  As 
Pillar (1983: 28) points out,  
 
[t]his combination of restraints –– the inability to avoid entering a war and the 
inability to make full use of military capabilities once in it –– means that wars which 
formerly would either never have been fought in the first place, or fought to a swift 
and decisive conclusion, are now fought in a restrained and carefully controlled way. 
 This encourages deadlock and compromise and reduces the likelihood of 
capitulation. 
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PIRA effectively exploited the British Army's hesitancy to use force and concern with legality to 
engage in a protracted campaign of paramilitary violence. Thus, although violence was not 
eradicated, losses were kept at an "acceptable" level (in the words of Northern Ireland Secretary of 
State Merlyn Rees) and the war dragged on and on.8 
In addition to the cultural values of Republicanism and British security policy, the divergent 
interests of the major players in the Northern Ireland conflict also prevented any easy resolution of 
the political and military issues underlying the violence.  Each group was fundamentally opposed to 
the interests and views propounded by the other groups, and generally unwilling to accept 
compromise of any sort.  In brief, the Unionists despised the Republicans on political and social 
grounds and viewed any involvement of the Republic of Ireland in northern Irish politics with 
suspicion; the Republicans rejected the British presence in Ireland and saw the Unionists as sectarian 
and politically misguided; the British mistrusted the involvement of the Republic of Ireland but 
needed the vote of the Ulster Unionists; and the Republic of Ireland wanted to distance itself from 
the problems of the province altogether and yet retained a sentimental feeling towards the history of 
the IRA  (Whyte 1990).  These views derive from complex historical and political facts and are 
worthy of further explanation. 
Successive British governments have proposed various unworkable solutions to the political 
problems of Northern Ireland.   From 1921 until the mid-1970's Northern Ireland was ruled through 
Unionist controlled Stormont Parliament.  Majority home rule reduced Northern Ireland to the status 
of a dependent colony, allowed Unionist domination of the security apparatus, effectively removed 
Catholics from political life, and led to the catastrophic deployment of British troops in 1969.  As a 
result of Stormont and the events of 1969, the British government outlined new principles in the 
1973 Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals (Great Britain 1973).  This paper made it clear that 
Unionists should be prevented from exercising total domination, and that any political arrangements 
require the involvement of the Irish Republic if they are to satisfy northern Nationalists.  This 
power-sharing assembly combined with an all-Ireland council has remained the model for British 
political initiative since that time. 
The Unionists generally dislike the power-sharing arrangement preferred by the British and 
view Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom. Although they form a majority in 
Northern Ireland, they would be a minority if the island were unified.9  Unionists, not surprisingly, 
reject any political arrangement that would entail being governed by the Republic of Ireland and 
thereby losing their economic and political status. Since Unionists have traditionally occupied 
positions of political power and have controlled the domestic economy, they have much to loose if 
the distribution of power were altered.  The security industry in Northern Ireland, including the 
police, the now defunct Ulster Defense Regiment, and the prisons, historically have been staffed by 
Unionists and would shrink radically if the conflict ceased. 
Power sharing with Nationalists and increased involvement of the Irish Republic are seen by 
Unionists as concessions by Britain to the Nationalists.  Historically, concessions by the British 
government towards the Republican community have resulted in a backlash by Unionists against the 
British Government.10  Unionists, it has been said, have been willing to kill British soldiers in order 
to defend their right to remain British (Dewar 1985: 99).  Prior to their own declared cease-fire, 
Loyalists were also willing to take on the Republic of Ireland.  "Loyalists are not going to allow their 
country to be taken away from them," said Ray Smallwoods, the chief political strategist of loyalist 
Montgomery Sapone 28 
 
 
paramilitaries.  "We've seen what the IRA has gotten by bombing and killing. Our war is not just 
with the IRA. It's with Dublin. And we're prepared to fight to the death" (Cullen 1994: 1).   Loyalist 
paramilitaries have been quite willing to carry out their threats: in the last three years more people 
were killed by Loyalist than Nationalist paramilitaries. 
Though Unionist objections to British withdrawal and power sharing may seem clear enough, 
the same objections by the Irish Government are a bit harder to understand. Since 1937, the Irish 
government has claimed constitutional jurisdiction over Northern Ireland.  Article 2 of the Irish 
Constitution, declares that "the national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, it's islands 
and the territorial seas."  In 1990, this claim was reaffirmed by the Irish Supreme Court in 
McGimpsey v. Ireland which claimed that the "re-integration of the national territory" was a 
"constitutional imperative." For many years the British government did not object to these claims of 
sovereignty although they conflicted with the Government of Ireland Act 1920.  Article 75 of the 
Government of Ireland Act (1920) provides that:  
 
Notwithstanding the establishment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland...the 
supreme authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected 
and undiminished over all persons, matters and things in Northern Ireland and every 
part thereof. 
 
At the heart of the Irish Constitution lay an aspirational claim to the political control of the whole of 
Ireland. One would imagine, this being the case, that the Irish Government would be delighted with 
British willingness to allow them to assume a larger role in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland 
through diplomatic agreements.  The Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 gave the Irish Republic the right 
to put forward views and proposals on matters relating to the administration of Northern Ireland 
(including security) in return for improved security co-ordination on their side of the border  
(Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies 1994: 19).   Yet, unification is not a popular 
solution with the Irish Government.  The British withdrawal from Northern Ireland would create 
innumerable problems for Dublin.  Not only would the Republic be required to absorb the Unionists 
(and cope with any violence which might be directed at the Irish government), they would also 
assume the considerable financial burden of underwriting the depressed economy of Northern 
Ireland. 
Nor are Northern Republicans particularly keen on being absorbed by the Irish government.  
From the perspective of Sinn Féin, the Irish government has abandoned the principle of Irish self-
determination and has basically ratified the British claim to Northern Ireland.  The Anglo-Irish 
Agreement, European Union membership, and the ratification of the Single Europe Act are seen as 
an erosion of Irish sovereignty and control of resources and a movement towards a "NATO view of 
international affairs” (Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies 1994: 83).   Republicans 
view the current incarnation of Ireland as being little more than a dependent of Great Britain, since 
over fifty percent of its “foreign” trade is with the UK.  Nationalists and Republicans believe that 
resolution to the political problems must include the democratic participation of all of the Irish 
people and that the negotiations depend on the political authority and legitimacy wielded by the Irish 
government.  While Nationalists and Republicans have sought a greater role for Dublin in the 
ceasefire process, they are not seeking a simple end to partition resulting in reunification.  Rather, 
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their long-term goal is to establish a democratic socialist republic based on the 1916 Proclamation, 
which would include decentralized economic and political structures in a pluralist, bilingual, non-
sexist, and non-aligned Ireland (Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies 1994: 150).  
A total reconstruction of the Irish state is probably not what the Irish government has in mind 
as a possible political future.  Especially not at the hands of Sinn Féin. In the Republic of Ireland, 
Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA are treated as terrorists or criminals and generally are not viewed 
as legitimate political entities.  Sinn Féin, for example, has been censored from speaking on 
television or radio under Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act (not renewed in 1994).  Yet, Sinn Féin 
and the Provisional IRA are responsible for the very existence of the Irish Republic, having 
successfully fought a war against the British in 1916 for independence.  It is not surprising that, 
historically, the government of the Republic of Ireland and the Fianna Fail party in particular have 
been sympathetic to the northern Republican cause. The Republic of Ireland has sometimes refused 
to extradite Republicans convicted of paramilitary offenses and has turned a blind eye to the use of 
the border as a "fall back" for paramilitaries during operations.  Perhaps the most shocking example 
of covert support of the IRA by the government of the Republic of Ireland was the arrest of Charles 
Haughey, minister for the Gaelteacht under Jack Lynch's Fianna Fail party.  Haughey and four other 
members of the Fianna Fail government were arrested for conspiracy to import arms that were to be 
sent to the IRA.  "Whether the Cabinet either knew or implicitly approved of Haughey's activities 
remains to this day a less than satisfactorily answered question” (O'Malley 1990: 22 fn.). 
 
Breaking the Stalemate 
The geographical containment of the conflict, the prevention of escalation through legal 
structures and the unwillingness to incur international approbation all served to turn the conflict in 
Northern Ireland into a “stalemate.”  A stalemate is a condition of conflict where neither belligerent 
party can achieve a decisive military victory and which can be almost indefinitely sustained by both 
parties (Goodman and Bogart 1992: 1). In stalemated wars, neither belligerent party is able to 
achieve a decisive victory, nor are they able to exhaust their opponent to a state of financial or 
military collapse. This has consequences for the ceasefire negotiation process.  Negotiating a cease-
fire after a stalemate tends to be much more laborious and intricate since the “winner” may be 
unclear and the belligerents may overestimate their own bargaining power  (Smith 1995: 5). 
Counter-insurgency operations or low-intensity conflicts that end in stalemate, such as that in 
Northern Ireland, appear even less amenable to negotiated settlement  (Goodman and Bogart 1992: 
1). In these conflicts the very identity of the belligerents and the legal status of the conflict are often 
unclear.  In Northern Ireland, for example, the “belligerents” might include the British Army, PIRA, 
Ulster Defence Association (UDA), Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO), Red Hand 
Commandos, Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), or any number 
of other armed groups. PIRA declared a cessation of all military operations, but did not specify 
against whom.  The Loyalist paramilitaries made a similarly ambivalent statement.  Moreover, the 
legal status of the conflict in Northern Ireland is indeterminate.  There is disagreement on whether 
the conflict ought to be called an “internal disturbance,” as the British government would have it or 
whether it ought to be called a “war,” as the Republican movement would claim.11 
  Limited conflict between equally matched opponents, such as that in Northern Ireland, is 
almost indefinitely sustainable.12  Although more than three thousand people have been killed since 
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the latest period of conflict began thirty years ago, the conflict was not excessively costly in human 
terms. Similarly, the financial costs to Britain of prolonged low-level violence were negligible as a 
portion of the total economy. Neither the British Army nor PIRA were short on weapons, 
ammunition or manpower.  Both would have been able to continue the war almost indefinitely.   
In light of the military sustainablity and cultural entrenchment of the conflict, the question 
arises: why didn't the conflict continue indefinitely?13  For a variety of reasons, a ceasefire became 
simultaneously desirable to both the British and the Republican movement, despite the political, 
cultural and military entrenchment of the conflict in Northern Ireland.  
British willingness to enter into negotiations with the Provisional IRA resulted partially from 
the end of the Cold War, which changed the strategic map of Europe.  During the Cold War, the 
Republic of Ireland was not a member of NATO and disallowed any NATO bases or operations. 
Northern Ireland, being a British possession, was NATO friendly soil. Once NATO defense of the 
North Atlantic became unnecessary, Northern Ireland declined in strategic importance.  The conflict 
in Northern Ireland, despite the excellent training benefits it provided for British Army regiments 
and the convenient "proving ground" it provided for British defense, had become enormously 
expensive.  Deployment of nineteen-thousand troops has cost over £1 billion per annum, 
compensation to victims of violence by the Northern Ireland Office cost £30-50 million per annum, 
and the Exchequer grant to Northern Ireland cost over £3 billion  (Institute for European Defence 
and Strategic Studies 1994: 14). Furthermore, the concerns of insurance companies regarding the 
costs of bombs in London in 1992 and 1993 influenced the willingness of various ministers to 
support negotiations with PIRA  (Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies 1994: 14). 
The Provisional IRA’s willingness to enter into negotiations also resulted from a confluence 
of factors.  Since Gerry Adams and the other members of the northern leadership contingent (Tom 
Hartley, Danny Morrison, Mitchel McLaughlin) have risen to power in the Republican movement, 
Republican ideology has shifted from the primacy of the armed struggle to an increased focus on 
political process.  According to Gerry Adams, "armed struggle itself is a tactic and one cannot shoot 
or bomb an independent Ireland into existence....  The tactic of armed struggle is of primary 
importance because it provides a vital cutting edge.  Without it, the issue of Ireland would not even 
be an issue."  "At the same time," Adams continues, "there is a realization in Republican circles that 
armed struggle on its own is inadequate and that non-armed forms of political struggle are at least as 
important” (1995: 63).   This political refocus has led to a certain type of constitutionalization.  "In 
the past, the republican movement was a separatist movement with radical tendencies.  In its current 
embodiment, the radical tendency is for the first time in control..." (Adams 1995: 163).    
Additionally, rumors that the US would increase its aid package to Northern Ireland from $19.6 
million to $120-200 million in order to restore the infrastructure and boost employment may have 
encouraged the Republican ceasefire (Adams 1995: 51). 
In addition to the political and economic reasons for the ceasefire, recognition of a military 
stalemate also led to the ceasefire.  British policy since the late 1970's has assumed that PIRA cannot 
be defeated militarily  (Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies 1994: 12).  Likewise, 
PIRA is aware that they will never be able to amass enough military force to compel Britain to 
withdraw.  Belligerent recognition that the war is stalemated and is likely to remain so (or that one 
party has decisively more power than the other) is, according to Smith, the first precondition for a 
cease-fire.  Belligerents must also believe, as the British did, that this power balance is unlikely to 
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shift either in their favor through military action, or against them through a cease-fire (Smith 1995: 
8). 
In Northern Ireland, the acknowledgment of a military stalemate made political resolution 
possible.  Because a military victory was impossible, the solution to the problem had to be a political 
one. The ceasefire in Northern Ireland did not result from defeat or military necessity.14  Rather, the 
cease-fire process was driven by an acknowledgment that the war was unwinnable. 
 
Talking it Out 
The current cease-fire and talks about the future of Northern Ireland are the result of a long 
process of political reevaluation by Sinn Féin.  Since 1987, Sinn Féin has been developing a strategy 
for peace, beginning with a discussion paper called A Scenario for Peace (Sinn Féin 1991).  In 1990, 
Sinn Féin re-established contact with the British government through secret diplomatic channels 
which had been used extensively during the prior cease-fires and 1981 hungerstrike.  In 1992, Sinn 
Féin circulated Towards a Lasting Peace in Ireland, a discussion paper that explicated their view of 
what was needed in order for peaceful resolution (Sinn Féin 1994a).15 
Attempts to develop a joint nationalist strategy led to talks between Adams and John Hume 
the leader of the Social and Democratic Labour Party, the largest constitutional nationalist party in 
Northern Ireland.  In April 1993, Hume and Adams issued a joint statement, declaring the right of 
"the Irish people as a whole... to national self-determination” (Hume and Adams 1993).  The Hume-
Adams initiative, which was eventually endorsed by the Irish government, was the snowball that 
launched the peace avalanche. 
The on-going secret talks between British government and Sinn Féin were made public in 
November 1993.  Following a series of rumors and leaks, Sir Patrick Mayhew made an 
announcement in Parliament.  Mayhew claimed that PIRA had initiated the dialogue with this 
message allegedly sent by Martin McGuiness, Sinn Féin’s Vice President: 
 
The conflict is over but we need your advice on how to bring it to a close.  We wish 
to have an unannounced cease-fire in order to hold dialogue leading to peace.  We 
cannot announce such a move as it will lead to confusion for the volunteers because 
press will misinterpret it as a surrender.  We cannot meet Secretary of State's public 
renunciation of violence, but it would be given privately as long as we were sure that 
we were not being tricked (Great Britain 1993). 
 
This announcement caused public uproar in the Republican community, Parliament and the 
British press.  Because the British government had phrased the announcement in such a way that it 
appeared that Sinn Féin was the initiating party, Sinn Féin nearly backed out of any negotiations 
with the British.  According to Adams, the admission by Mayhew "breach[ed] the confidentiality 
which we had at all times respected and ... misrepresent[ed] the content of our exchanges.  The bad 
faith and double dealing involved clearly presented us with serious difficulties in assessing the 
sincerity of the British government..." (Adams 1995: 205). As the message makes clear, PIRA was 
unwilling to be seen by its membership as the party who had asked for peace.16 
In 1993 the Joint Declaration on Northern Ireland (“The Downing Street Declaration”) was 
signed by British and Irish governments.  The Declaration articulated principles of negotiation and 
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framed the broad issues crucial for a negotiated settlement.  The Declaration offered concessions to 
both Unionists and Nationalists (McKittrick 1994: 321): 
 
The British government agrees that it is for the people of Ireland alone, by agreement 
between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination on 
the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, north and south, to bring about a 
United Ireland, if that is their wish (Great Britain and Republic of Ireland 1993). 
 
This statement pleased Unionists by including the concept of consent. For Unionists “consent” 
(often referred to as “the Unionist veto”) meant that political or constitutional status of Northern 
Ireland will not be altered without their agreement. 
Republicans had a mixed response to the Declaration.  The inclusion of the concept of self-
determination, which is central to the ideology of Republicanism, reassured some Republicans. 
Furthermore, the Joint Declaration attempted to bring Sinn Féin, historically marginalized in 
preference to the more moderate SDLP, into the constitutional talks.  Unfortunately, the Declaration 
also specified that Sinn Féin would be welcomed at the negotiating table only after renouncing 
violence.  According to Martin McGuiness, the declaration was “worthless” (Smith 1995: 206). 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Declaration for Republicans was the British 
government’s declaration that it had no "selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland."  
This statement marked a fundamental shift in British policy toward Northern Ireland.  Britain was 
apparently backing down from its promise to the Unionists to keep Ulster British.  The abdication of 
Britain from any political responsibility for Northern Ireland prompted conservative critics of the 
Declaration to argue that, "Crucially, the Declaration puts the future of Ulster in an exclusively Irish 
– and not British – context” (Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies 1994: 12). 
After the Provisional IRA Army Council voted not to reject the document outright (Coogan 
1994: 496), Sinn Féin asked the British government for clarification of the Joint Declaration.  In 
response to a written question posed by Sinn Féin, the British representative stated: "[We] accept the 
validity of all electoral mandates, including that of Sinn Féin..." (Dunnigan 1995: 46).  Furthermore, 
the British stated that any agreement will be based on "full respect for the rights and identities of 
both traditions in Ireland" (Dunnigan 1995: 46).  In effect, the Declaration opened the constitutional 
status of Northern Ireland (including the Government of Ireland Act) to discussion, confirmed that 
no party had veto power over policy in the North, and recognized Sinn Féin's mandate (Dunnigan 
1995: 46). 
Political recognition by the U.S., which had long had a “special relationship” with Britain, 
also indicated to Republicans that British intentions were good.  As Pillar (1983: 79) points out, 
“[a]ction by a nonbelligerent party provides an even better opportunity [to begin negotiations].  A 
suitable proposal by a third party eliminates the need for either belligerent to move first in offering 
negotiations.”  Although previous U.S. administrations had denied Gerry Adams admission to the 
United States, in January 1994, President Bill Clinton effectively opened diplomatic relations with 
Sinn Féin by granting Gerry Adams a visa to enter the U.S. 
PIRA continued to mount attacks in the months leading up to their declaration of a cease-
fire.17  In continuing to attack British targets, the Provisional IRA was sending a signal that it was 
not capitulating out of weakness.  In order to avoid the stigma of weakness attached to peace offers, 
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belligerents may attempt to demonstrate strength and determination by escalating violence directly 
prior to or at the beginning of a peace conference. The purpose is "to demonstrate through armed 
action that one's diplomatic initiatives do not indicate a weakening of the will” (Pillar 1983:187). 
The Provisional IRA finally declared a cease-fire on August 31, 1994 in a brief, four-
paragraph statement.  It began:  
 
Recognizing the potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the 
democratic peace process and underline our definitive commitment to its success, the 
leadership of Óglaigh na hÉireann [Youth of Ireland in Irish] have decided that as of 
midnight Wednesday, August 31, there will be a complete cessation of military 
operations. All our units have been instructed accordingly (Provisional Irish 
Republican Army 1994). 
 
 After commending the sacrifices of Republican volunteers, the statement affirmed that "[w]e 
believe that an opportunity to create a just and lasting settlement has been created."  After the 
declaration of the cease-fire, Gerry Adams declared that "[t]he onus is on the British government, 
the onus is on (Prime Minister) John Major to seize this moment” (Kiernan 1994: 1). For the 
Provisional IRA, this cease-fire was conditional and would be honored only as long as progress was 
being made towards the right to self-determination asserted in the Joint Declaration. 
While moderate Loyalists were optimistic about the cease-fire, hard-liners saw the cease-fire 
as a threat to their existence.  As Pillar (1983:162) points out: "Solutions which leave open the 
possibility that the enemy will eventually take power are not highly valued because they pose a risk 
not only to one's political goals but even to one's life." The Ulster Freedom Fighters called the cease-
fire a "recipe for civil war" (Kiernan 1994: 1). Belfast graffiti after the PIRA cease-fire summed up 
the Loyalist position:  "Better to die on your feet than live on your knees in a united Ireland.”  
On October 13, 1994, six weeks after PIRA declared a cease-fire, the Ulster Volunteer Force 
and Ulster Freedom Fighters, also declared a cease-fire.18  Loyalist paramilitaries declared a cease-
fire only after assurances were given about Northern Ireland's constitutional position as part of the 
United Kingdom.  The Loyalist statement, read by Gusty Spence, the former leader of the UVF 
convicted of murdering a Catholic man in 1968, said: "The permanence of our cease-fire will be 
completely dependent upon the continued cessation of all nationalist republican violence. The sole 
responsibility for a return to war lies with them" (UPI Newswire 1994).19 
Following the ceasefire, British officials held preliminary talks with Sinn Féin in December 
of 1994.  In early 1995, the British and Irish governments published the Framework Document, 
outlining recommendations for a political settlement of the conflict in Northern Ireland (Great 
Britain and Republic of Ireland 1995). The Framework Document satisfied neither Republicans (as it 
contained provisions for the Unionist consent) nor Unionists (as it accorded too much power to 
Dublin). The Framework Document was quickly shelved.  
Disarmament was the biggest barrier in the peace process following the ceasefires.  The 
British government and the Unionists demanded that all-party talks must be preceded by a 
permanent cease-fire and decommissioning of weapons. The Provisional IRA refused to renounce 
violence or to decommission their weapons.  An independent disarmament commission chaired by 
former U.S. Senator George Mitchell was established by the Republic of Ireland, which is accorded 
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a consultative role in the governance of Northern Ireland under the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement.  
The Mitchell commission recommended in a report released on January 24, 1996 that the British 
government drop its demand that the Provisional IRA disarm before Sinn Féin be allowed to take 
part in the peace talks.  The report did suggest that Sinn Féin should be required to declare the 
ceasefire permanent and to agree to disarmament simultaneously with talks  (Editors 1996a: A5). 
The British Prime Minister rejected the commission’s proposal, insisting instead on elections 
to confirm the strength of the political parties' respective mandates. All-party talks would take place 
after special elections to choose delegates to the all-party talks.  Essentially, the British demanded 
the creation of an internal political assembly in Northern Ireland as the precursor to political 
negotiations (Editors 1996b: A5).  Both the Republican community in Northern Ireland and the Irish 
government saw the creation of an internal political assembly as kow-towing to the political 
demands of the Ulster Unionists.  An internal political assembly also negated what Republicans saw 
as the “all-Ireland” aspect of the conflict.  The British Prime Minister was also criticized for 
prioritizing the coming election and retaining the voting power of the Ulster Unionist Party in the 
British parliament.   
Following the British government's demand for a political assembly and the rejection of the 
Mitchell Commission’s proposal, on February 9, 1996 PIRA issued a statement declaring that a 
resumption of the "armed struggle" was taking place, citing its frustration with the lack of movement 
on political talks. According to the statement: "The cessation presented an historic challenge for 
everyone and the IRA commends the leaderships of nationalist Ireland at home and abroad. They 
rose to the challenge. The British Prime Minister did not" (Provisional Irish Republican Army 1996: 
paragraph 4). Later that day, the Provisional IRA detonated a 1,500-pound fertilizer bomb at Canary 
Wharf in east London, killing two people and injuring hundreds. 
Despite the end of the ceasefire, the British government carried on with its pre-Canary Wharf 
Plan.  Elections took place on May 30, 1996 and seated a one hundred ten member forum, to 
"advise" teams engaged in promised multi-party negotiations.20  Following the election, multi-party 
talks began on June 10. Sinn Féin was barred from the talks on the grounds that the Provisional IRA 
had not resumed its cease-fire. Following Sinn Féin's exclusion, the Provisional IRA exploded a van 
bomb in downtown Manchester on June 15th. 
Despite Sinn Féin’s exclusion from the talks, negotiations for a political settlement 
continued. On 1 May 1997 the Labour Party were elected to power in British General Election. Tony 
Blair, then leader of the Labour Party became Prime Minister while Marjorie (Mo) Mowlam was 
appointed as Secretary of State of Northern Ireland. The new Labour Government made a number of 
overtures to Sinn Féin, expressing a desire to include them in talks if the Provisional IRA would 
renew the ceasefire.  According to a statement of the Provisional IRA, "having assessed the current 
political situation, the leadership of the Oglaigh na hÉireann are announcing a complete cessation of 
military operations from 12 midday on Sunday 20 July, 1997” (Provisional Irish Republican Army 
1997: paragraph 4). After eschewing all paramilitary activity for six weeks, Sinn Féin signed the 
Mitchell Principles (agreeing to a democratic, non-violent political resolution) and was admitted into 
the talks. 
In January of 1998, Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) was expelled from the talks on the 
grounds that the paramilitary group with which it is associated, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) 
(a.k.a. the Ulster Defence Association), had been involved in the recent murders of at least three 
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Catholics. The British and Irish governments indicated that the UDP could re-enter the talks process 
if the UFF maintained its renewed ceasefire.  On February  20,1998 Sinn Féin was expelled from the 
multi-party talks on the grounds that PIRA had been involved in the recent deaths of two men. 
Shortly after the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) rejoined the multi-party talks following the its 
suspension, Sinn Féin (SF) rejoined the multi-party talks in mid-March 1998. 
The Good Friday Agreement was reached on April 10, 1998 (Great Britain 1998).  Under the 
terms of the Agreement, a new Northern Ireland Assembly would be elected by proportional 
representation, with executive and legislative powers and safeguards to ensure its operation on the 
basis of cross-community support.21  In terms of security matters, the Agreement essentially creates 
a quid pro quo: if the Republicans (and other parties) will declare a complete and unequivocal 
ceasefire, stop all procurement of weapons, dismantle paramilitary structures actively directing and 
promoting violence, cooperate fully with the Independent Commission on decommissioning, and 
abjure from using other organizations as proxies for violence, the British government will de-
escalate security, withdraw troops, release paramilitary prisoners, and amend the legal system.  The 
Good Friday Agreement sets a two-year target for full decommissioning of paramilitary arms and 
explosives.  It provides two possible methods of decommissioning: the provision of information to 
the Commission, leading to the collection and destruction of arms; and the destruction of arms by 
those who are in possession of them.  
While the British Government has taken a number of steps that indicate their intention to 
follow through with the letter of the Good Friday Agreement, Republicans have taken only very 
small steps towards decommissioning. The British have de-escalated security by ending routine 
military patrolling in many parts of Northern Ireland, by reducing the overall troop level to its lowest 
at any time since the Provisional IRA’s first ceasefire in August 1994, and by demolishing the 
British Army’s Fort Whiterock base in Belfast in the near future. The British government has also 
instituted prisoner release under the Northern Ireland Sentences Act that came into force at the end 
of July 1998. This Act provides for the early release of over four hundred prisoners in Northern 
Ireland over the next two years in accordance with the Good Friday Agreement.22  The sole action of 
the Republican movement thus far has been the appointment on 2 September 1998 of Martin 
McGuinness as Sinn Féin’s representative to the International Commission on Decommissioning. 
 
Stumbling Blocks in the Ceasefire Process 
From this cursory review of the events during the cease-fire process, the unwillingness of the 
Provisional IRA to decommission their weapons in light of the British quid pro quo de-escalation of 
security measures and withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland seems like pure folly.  
Haven’t the British clearly shown that they are eager to evacuate Northern Ireland?  Similarly, Sinn 
Féin’s overwhelming mistrust of British intentions, despite good-faith assurances offered by the 
British and the U.S. governments appears incomprehensible.  Surely, the British are playing fair?  It 
is also hard to understand Sinn Féin’s inability to negotiate on behalf of the Provisional IRA. How 
can Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA negotiate a truce when they can’t control their own members? 
The rise of hard-line paramilitary splinter groups like the Real IRA is also perplexing.  Does the 
existence of such groups belie the Republicans’ claim that they desire peace? The answer to the last 
question goes straight to the heart of issues central to Republican political identity. 
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Republican suspicions of “perfidious Albion” 
The unwillingness of the Republican movement to extend any trust to the British government 
can be explained by sketching briefly the history of IRA ceasefires.  The present ceasefire is the 
most recent in a long series. In addition to the three-day Christmas truces declared annually since 
1990, bilateral cease-fires occurred in 1972 and 1974-5.  During the 1981 hungerstrike, PIRA 
declared a cease-fire so that the deaths of the hungerstrikers would not be overshadowed by other 
military actions.  Most recently, PIRA had called a brief halt to hostilities in April 1993.  
From a Republican perspective, the British were responsible for breaking these ceasefires.  
For example, the 1972 cease-fire was broken when the British Army and UDA attacked civilians in 
West Belfast  (MacStiofain 1975: 260).  Loyalist violence directed against the Nationalist 
community drew PIRA into armed engagement.  According to one PIRA Army Council member, "If 
our units had been ordered to stand aside, ...the IRA would have lost the defense initiative and all 
credibility with the people” (MacStiofain 1975: 289). 
The settlement negotiations following these ceasefires all involved the same basic 
Republican demands: public recognition of the right of the Irish people to decide the future of 
Ireland, a declaration of intention to withdraw British troops, and the grant of a general amnesty for 
political prisoners (Finn 1991: 80). Not surprisingly, the British were unwilling to grant the IRA’s 
demands in 1972 or 1974-5 (Wichert 1991: 171).  In the 1970’s, the British Army had no intention 
of withdrawing, believing that the war could be won on the ground.  The expectation of eventual 
victory almost certainly inhibited the British desire for cease-fire  (Smith 1995: 21). 
A major factor underlying Republican resistance to the declaration of a permanent cease-fire 
was their perception of Britain as perfidious and double-dealing. PIRA’s experiences with these 
prior cease-fires led them to suspect that the British would use the current cease-fire as an 
opportunity to regroup and develop new strategies. According to Adams (1995:103),  
  
the British government has also used bilateral truces with the IRA to gain the upper 
hand, to cause confusion in republican ranks and to introduce new strategies.  It has 
never engaged in a truce with the serious intention of considering or conceding the 
republican demands.  In particular, the lengthy bilateral truce of 1974-5 was used to 
push ahead with the 'Ulsterisation/ 'normalisation'/ 'criminalisation' policy. 
 
The Provisional IRA, like many belligerents considering ceasefires, were concerned that a ceasefire 
would put them in a worse position and the British in a better position if fighting resumed (Smith 
1995:16). 
It is not unusual for belligerents to take advantage of cease-fires to regroup and rearm.  In 
international law, this is generally viewed as a legitimate practice.23  According to Oppenheim 
(1952: 551), "belligerents during an armistice may, outside the line where the forces face each other, 
do everything and anything they like regarding defence and preparation of offence..."  A ceasefire, in 
this sense, allows for a continuation of war by other means  (Seabury 1970: 102).  Since wars are 
legally ended only by formal peace treaties, this continuation of war by other means is, in a sense, 
legitimate (Smith 1995:17). Ceasefires "may simply fix the conditions under which the fighting will 
be resumed, at a later date, and with a new intensity" (Bailey 1982: 3). 
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Having experienced the British “continuation of the war” under the guise of prior cease-fires, 
the Republican movement was wary of British intentions in the 1990s no matter how eloquent the 
assurances.  Martin McGuinness, who negotiated the 1972 truce and was instrumental in the most 
recent cease-fire, resolved after the 1972 breach that "from [then] on there could be no question of 
an end to the violence until the ink on the treaty of withdrawal was dry" (Bishop and Mallie 1987: 
230). 
Permanence 
Although the Provisional IRA declared a "complete cessation of military operations," they 
did not affirm that it would be permanent. The Downing Street Declaration, which spelled out terms 
for peace talks, allowed Sinn Féin to join the negotiations three months after PIRA called a 
"permanent" end to violence.  Following the announcement of the cease-fire, Major requested an 
assurance that it was, indeed, permanent.  Neither Adams nor deputy Sinn Féin leader Martin 
McGuinness were willing to describe the cease-fire as "permanent." "I think you have to take the 
statement at face value," according to McGuinness  (Kiernan 1994: 1). 
A number of cultural and historical factors underlie PIRA's unwillingness to declare a 
"permanent" cease-fire.  First, from the perspective of Sinn Féin, asking PIRA to declare a 
permanent cease-fire before the withdrawal of British troops would place all the military obligations 
on PIRA.24 Declaring a permanent ceasefire would give the British exactly what they had long 
wished for (a de-clawed and powerless Provisional IRA), while the British themselves remained 
fully armed. Following the Loyalist cease-fire, Gerry Adams pointed out that "[t]he British 
government is now the only agency with armed forces under its control which has not ceased its 
military activity" (U.P.I. newswire 1994).  By declaring a permanent ceasefire, the Republican 
movement would receive nothing but further assurances. 
The second factor militating against declaring a permanent ceasefire concerns the basic 
political philosophy of the Republican movement.  The Republican philosophy of armed struggle is 
based on the notion that only force will compel Britain to leave Ireland.  There is the implication that 
since Britain has not withdrawn its troops, "by giving up force ...blood has been shed in vain" 
(Dunnigan and Martel 1987: 41). Dunnigan and Martel (1987: 41) refer to this problem as 
"entrapment:" belligerents locked into a confrontation believe that they have invested too much labor 
in establishing an international support network, the acquiring and hiding of arms shipments, 
organizing the required military training and political education of its members. PIRA’s cease-fire 
announcement (Provisional Irish Republican Army 1994) attempted to deal with the problem of 
entrapment by commending the volunteers who had died in the cause of Irish freedom: "We 
remember all those who have died for Irish freedom and we reiterate our commitment to our 
republican objectives." 
On October 22, Prime Minister John Major announced that he would accept the current 
cease-fire and that the ceasefire now being observed by both sides is "intended to be permanent."  As 
Pillar (1983: 91) points out, "The fundamental diplomatic act in an international negotiation is a 
change in one's offer –– a change in what a negotiator says he will accept as an agreement." 
Apparently in response to pressure from Reynolds and American leaders, Major accepted the terms 
of the ceasefire.  According to Major: "I am now prepared to make a working assumption that the 
cease-fire is intended to be permanent.... If we can continue reasonably to assume that Sinn Féin is 
establishing a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods, if the IRA continues to show that it has 
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ended terrorism, then we shall be ready to convene exploratory talks before this year is out" (Tuohy 
1994b: A1).  Major said the Provisional IRA's adherence to the cease-fire was "more compelling 
than their words” (Tuohy 1994b: A1). 
 
The Military Structure of the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
Sinn Féin’s inability to negotiate or speak on behalf of the Provisional IRA remains a major 
puzzle of the peace process in Northern Ireland.  Yet the inability of Sinn Féin to exercise control 
over the Army Council is a result of the basic structure of the organization. While many present 
leaders of Sinn Féin are former members of the Army Council (the governing body of the 
Provisional IRA) Sinn Féin does not control the Army Council.  The “armilite and the ballot box” 
strategy of PIRA, which accords equal primacy to electoral politics and military action, must satisfy 
the Army Council or risk splitting the movement. For example, Sinn Féin requested clarification by 
the British government of the Downing Street Declaration before they would bring the proposal to 
the Army Council (Wichert 1991: 121).  Without the Army Council’s full support for the cease-fire, 
Sinn Féin could not implement it.  According to Adams (1995: 221): "It was up to the IRA to hold 
their own consultations and come to their own decision.  I would have respected whatever decision 
they took." 
The Army Council’s inability to exercise total control over militant factions within the 
Provisional IRA also results from the organizational structure. The Provisional IRA is organized into 
active service units (ASUs).  Organizationally, ASUs are a cell structure rather than a traditional 
military hierarchy.  While this structure protects PIRA from infiltration and prevents any one person 
from knowing too much, it also limits the control that the Army Council actually has over the 
members.25 
This organizational structure has implications for the cease-fire negotiation process since "at 
a pure logistical level, a belligerent may actually be unable to cease fire because it cannot control the 
military forces which purport to fight for it"  (Smith 1995: 123). In the case of the Provisional IRA, a 
number of infringements since the cease-fire point to the unauthorized use of violence by volunteers 
who are dissatisfied with the negotiation strategy. During an armed robbery of a post office in 
Newry on November 11, 1994, a postal worker named Frank Kerr was killed (Melaugh 1994). After 
denying that it has authorized any use of weapons since the cease-fire, PIRA acknowledged ten days 
later that its members were responsible, although the robbery had not been "sanctioned" by PIRA 
leaders. 
 
Republican Factionalism 
   Perhaps one of the most serious stumbling blocks to the ceasefire is the resistance to political 
settlement within the Republican movement itself. In many paramilitary organizations, hard-line 
military factions are likely to be skeptical about the political process, and to view negotiation as 
capitulation. At the Letterkenny Conference, for example, eight-hundred party delegates of Sinn 
Féin dismissed the Downing Street Declaration as inadequate and tilted too much in favor of the 
Ulster Unionists.  Even at that time, military factions within PIRA saw the ceasefire declaration as a 
betrayal of the Republican movement.  Ruairi O'Bradaigh, IRA chief during the 1960s, told the 
Belfast Telegraph that the leadership has been "constitutionalized," meaning that political process 
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has replaced armed struggle to an unacceptable degree.  But in the nature of the long struggle, he 
said, another group would rise up to take its place (Tuohy 1994b: A1). 
Another group did, in fact, rise up to take the place of PIRA.  On 15 August, 1998 the Real 
IRA (RIRA) came to the attention of the general public when it detonated a car bomb in Omagh, 
Northern Ireland killing twenty-eight civilians and injuring more than two-hundred people. The 
RIRA is a “fundamentalist” Republican group that objected to the 1997 PIRA ceasefire and to the 
peace process. Despite the popular Republican support of the of the Good Friday Agreement, RIRA 
preferred to continue the armed struggle.  RIRA split following a convention of senior PIRA figures 
at Gweedore, County Donegal, in October 1997.  At this meeting, PIRA's Quarter Master General 
who was in charge of weapons, ammunition and explosives, resigned from the PIRA Executive.26 
While Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA retained the loyalty of the majority of Republicans, 
not all were satisfied with the northern leadership and their plan for peace. A number of senior PIRA 
figures, including some members of the General Headquarters Staff, which comes immediately 
below the Army Council in the PIRA chain of command, abandoned PIRA in favor of this splinter 
group.   RIRA absorbed elements of the PIRA's Southern Command and recruited some of PIRA's 
top bomb-makers giving them the capability to make home-made explosives, to prepare bombs and 
to assemble a range of mortars.  In addition to certain members of the Dublin Brigade, an entire 
PIRA unit in Tipperary is said to have gone over to RIRA with its arms.27 
 
Decommissioning of Weapons 
The single major stumbling block in the ceasefire negotiations has been the issue of 
decommissioning of the Provisional IRA’s arsenal.  The British government has consistently insisted 
on the decommissioning of the weapons before all-party peace talks.  Michael Ancram, Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland, stated that "peace without fundamental solutions is not a permanent 
peace. So we ask those with arms, 'If you are committed to peace permanently, why do you need a 
vast arsenal?'" (Montalbano 1995: A1).  Loyalists have also consistently refused to negotiate with 
PIRA without prior weapons decommissioning.  According to Michael Empey, a member of the 
Ulster Unionists: "Laying down arms is a test that the IRA is truly committed to peace. As long as 
they can turn on terror, we are not playing on a level field" (Montalbano 1995: A1).   
Despite demands from all sides, the Provisional IRA has consistently refused to 
decommission its weapons. For the Provisional IRA, decommissioning amounted to a form of 
military surrender that it was unprepared to undertake (Editors 1996c: A14). According to Gerry 
Adams,  "The British government is not simply interested in a gesture. It is, in reality, demanding 
the start of a surrender process as a precondition to all-party talks” (Bew and Gillespie 1996: 105). 
PIRA’s unwillingness to decommission weapons is related not only to the armed struggle 
against the British Army, but to the defensive role which weapons have played in nationalist 
communities.  According to Gerry Adams (1995: 50), "the circumstances which shaped the recent 
support for the IRA are, above all, the experience of the barricade days from 1969-1972."  During 
the Loyalists rioting in Belfast in August of 1969, the IRA (which had been defunct) rearmed and 
reorganized in order to defend the community from attack (deBaroid 1990).  The current expectation 
that PIRA will abandon its weapons runs counter to the fundamental worldview of Republicans -- 
that their communities are besieged by hostile British and Loyalist forces and that the only defense 
they can expect is what they themselves provide.   
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Following the approval of the Good Friday Agreement, the Provisional IRA issued a 
statement refusing to give up any of its weapons. “Let us make it clear that there will be no 
decommissioning by the IRA. This issue, as with any other matter affecting the IRA, its functions 
and objectives, is a matter only for the IRA, to be decided upon and pronounced upon by us” 
(Provisional IRA 1998).  The statement described the Northern Ireland peace deal as significant, but 
said it fell short of "presenting a solid basis for a lasting settlement."  "The leadership of Óglaigh na 
hÉireann have considered carefully the Good Friday document," the statement begins. "It remains 
our position that a durable peace settlement demands the end of British rule in Ireland and the 
exercise of the right of the people of Ireland to national self-determination" (Provisional IRA 1998). 
 
Articles 2 and 3 
Another stumbling block to an enduring peace settlement was the dual claim of the Republic 
and Ireland and Great Britain to the territory of Northern Ireland.  The modification of the Irish 
Constitution became the cause of a deadlock in drafting of a framework document for talks.  While 
this issue does not involve the Provisional IRA directly, it is bound up with the political history of 
Ireland and with concepts of cultural and national sovereignty.  The Irish Constitution and the 
British Government of Ireland Act both lay claim to the territorial sovereignty of Northern Ireland. 
Article 2 of the Irish Constitution, declares that "the national territory consists of the whole island of 
Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas." The phrase "national territory" implicitly makes a claim 
that the territory of Northern Ireland belongs to the Republic of Ireland. Article 3 states that 
"pending the re-integration of the national territory" the laws enacted by Parliament shall pertain to 
Northern Ireland.  Article 3 effectively claims the right to exercise legal jurisdiction over the whole 
island. In McGimpsey v. Ireland, the Irish Supreme Court declined to “abandon […] the claim to the 
re-integration of national territory," essentially reaffirming Irish territorial claims to Northern 
Ireland.28 
Negotiating these contradictory claims to sovereignty has been rather thorny. Earlier in the 
talks process, the British government proposed that if the Irish Government would amend the 
territorial claims in Article 2 and Article 3, the British government was willing to modify the terms 
of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act (and the subsequent 1973 Amendment).  Nobody was happy 
with this arrangement.  Although the original wording of Articles 2 and 3 was perceived as a threat 
by Unionists who do not consider themselves to be part of the Irish nation, the modification of the 
Government of Ireland Act (1920) was even worse.  Because the wording excludes Unionists, it is 
totally counter productive to the very objective that the articles purportedly sought to advance 
(Fitzgerald 1994). Alteration of Articles 2 and 3 was seen as a compromise by Irish nationalists.  By 
renouncing the claim over the territory of Northern Ireland, the partition of Ireland was legitimated. 
For Sinn Féin, the revocation of Articles 2 and 3 would "have the effect of leaving Britain's assertion 
of, and claim to, sovereignty over six Irish counties uncontested, while withdrawing Ireland's 
rightful claim to sovereignty” (Adams 1995: 206). 
The Good Friday Agreement seems to have provided some solution.  Under the Agreement, 
the Irish Constitution will be amended, abandoning the Republic's territorial claim on Northern 
Ireland and offering formal recognition that Northern Ireland is legitimately part of the United 
Kingdom.  This will please the British government and assure the Unionists that they will not 
become “Irish” without their consent.  The British Government agreed to repeal the 1920 
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Government of Ireland Act, thereby disavowing their sovereignty claim, and to introduce legislation 
to create a united Ireland should that become the wish of a majority in Northern Ireland. This 
arrangement will please Nationalists by removing Britain’s claim upon Irish soil and mollify the 
Unionists by guaranteeing Northern Ireland's place in the United Kingdom unless a majority want to 
change that status.  Additionally, this arrangement will probably meet with international approval; 
Adrian Guelke (1988) argues that islands are perceived by the international community as integral 
political units. 
 
Republican Constitutional Issues 
The appeal of a group like RIRA may, from the outside, seem incomprehensible.  They 
engaged without apology in the slaughter of civilians and seemed determined to destroy all the gains 
made during the ceasefire process.  Yet, RIRA did appeal to many Republicans. To Republicans, the 
appeal of the Real IRA was not based on a gruesome appreciation of the atrocities committed by 
gung-ho blood-crazed Provo gunmen.  Rather, the Real IRA touched a nerve in the Republican body 
politic.  The Real IRA claimed that they, in fact, were the “real” IRA. They claimed that their 
historical mandate and political legitimacy were derived from the1919 Dail. In their view, by 
participating in the political process and by giving up the armed struggle, the Provisional IRA had 
betrayed the fundamental values of the Republican movement. 
Historically, disputes over political legitimacy and who represents the “authentic” spirit of 
Republicanism have caused significant splits in the Republican movement. All of these splits 
resulted in considerable bloodshed and were (for Republicans) presumably worth fighting for. 
Perhaps the most well known split in the movement is that which resulted in the Irish Civil War, 
1921-1923. Similarly, disagreements over participation in the political process led to the 1970 
division of the organization into the Official and Provisional IRA.  The Provisional IRA rejected any 
political recognition of either Stormont, Dublin, or Westminster parliaments and thereby became the 
inheritor of the armed struggle tradition (Wichert 1991:121).  Although it never came to pass, an 
impending feud between the Provisional IRA and RIRA did not seem unlikely following the RIRA 
bomb in Omagh.29 
Disputes concerning the legitimacy of political mandate lie at the heart of the secret culture 
of Republicanism.  The appeal of the Real IRA, the refusal to give up weapons before “the ink on 
the treaty was dry,” the factionalism and militarism of the Republican movement, and the 
relationship between Sinn Féin and PIRA are all informed by the strange history of Republican 
constitutionalism. 
At the beginning of the 1916 uprising against the British occupation of Ireland, the leaders of 
the rebellion authored a Proclamation of the Irish Republic.  This was essentially an aspirational, 
constitutional charter document, as the actual Republic of Ireland only came into being following the 
Anglo-Irish War.  As part of the Proclamation of the Irish Republic, a parliament of the Irish 
Republic, known as the Dail Eireann, was established. The Irish Republican Brotherhood, a secret 
military organization, was renamed by the Dail to the IRA.  They took oaths to "support and defend 
the Irish Republic and the Government of the Irish Republic, which is Dail Eireann, against all 
enemies, foreign and domestic."  They then entered into a war of independence against the British 
Government.  While the IRA won freedom for the southern twenty-six counties of Ireland, the 
victory was incomplete. 
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In December 1921, the Dail Eireann signed a treaty with England which gave them the status 
as a nation-state within the dominion of the British Empire and which ended the Anglo-Irish War.  
Northern Ireland was then partitioned from the rest of the island and became a British protectorate.  
Sinn Féin split into two factions in the Dail: those favoring the Treaty, and those opposed.  In 1922, 
when the Dail accepted the Treaty, the IRA withdrew its allegiance and fell back on its own 
convention for authority (Cronin 1980: 132).  The Anti-Treaty faction called themselves 
Republicans, believing that the Anglo-Irish War had been fought in order to found an independent 
republic, outside of any political influence of England.  The Irish Free State came into existence in 
1922, and the Republican anti-Treaty forces began a guerrilla war against it, known as the Irish Civil 
War.30  The anti-Treaty forces or Republicans refused to participate in any way in the political 
process and vowed to continue the armed struggle against the British occupation of Ireland. 
These historical facts have informed Republican political thinking for over seventy years, 
and still influence the daily functioning of the organization.  As the direct organizational descendant 
of the anti-Treaty Republicans, PIRA claims a historical mandate as the legitimate government of 
the Irish Republic.31  No other political organization holds this authority –– it is the prerogative of 
the Army Council itself.  Every Republican owes allegiance to the Army Council, of which Sinn 
Féin is merely the proxy.  The training manual of the Provisionals, The Green Book, states that "The 
leadership of the IRA is the lawful government of the Irish Republic"  (Clarke 1987: 2).32  
Essentially, PIRA views itself as the legal successor of the Second Dail, and therefore as the 
legitimate government of the Irish Republic (Cronin 1980: 208).33  Sinn Féin, therefore, has no 
power of its own, but can only act under the political will of the Provisional IRA.34 
Historically, the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin have refused any political participation in 
British institutions, as they see the British government in Northern Ireland as illegitimate.  As a force 
of occupation, the British government lacks any political mandate.  Participation, therefore, of 
Republicans would legitimize an unacceptable political situation. But this view seems to be 
changing slowly.  On 10 May 1998 Sinn Féin decided, at a second Ard Fheis in Dublin, to support 
the Belfast Agreement.  Sinn Féin’s decision was made possible, in part, by a change in the IRA’s 
constitution allowing Sinn Féin to take up seats in the new Northern Ireland Assembly. Most 
speakers at the Ard Fheis emphasized that Sinn Féin’s acceptance of the Belfast Agreement was no 
more than a tactical "extension of the armed struggle.” The Provisional IRA would retain its arms 
and (as Gerry Kelly put it) the decision to participate in a Northern Ireland Assembly was taken in 
the knowledge that "in six months we can revisit it" (British Information Service 1998).  These 
statements go far in explaining Republican willingness to engage in political process -- if that 
participation can be couched as “tactical” or “provisional” then it does not confer unearned 
legitimacy on the British political machine. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to show how the cultural values that helped sustain the war also had 
a direct impact on the cease-fire process. PIRA's refusal to decommission weapons or to declare a 
"permanent" cease-fire as a precondition to entering into negotiations reflects not only a utilitarian 
strategic decision but also reflects a set of cultural values.  In a culture that reveres military 
competence and sees the Anglo-Irish war as historical proof of the efficacy of arms, the 
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decommissioning of weapons threatens to negate the foundation upon which Irish Republican 
culture is based.  In light of these values and attitudes, what is the prospect for permanent peace? 
PIRA appears willing to bargain during negotiations, to accept a staged withdrawal of British 
troops and to accept the principle of democratic consent to political change.  Yet this flexibility only 
extends so far.  Because they are not simply an organization but the military expression of a complex 
culture, PIRA will not back down on certain issues.  In the interests of self-protection and cultural 
militarism, PIRA will probably resist decommissioning of weapons unless the British government 
withdraws troops.  Their unwillingness to declare a permanent ceasefire indicates that the ceasefire 
is a tactic in much the same way that armed struggle was a tactic.  If they fail to get what they seek 
through negotiations, they may begin the military campaign again.  On the other hand, after the 
experience of peace for such an extended period, their support base in the Republican community 
may shrink.  Peace, like war, may become an entrenched condition. 
 
Notes 
1  Ceasefires represent an indeterminate state between peace and war. The difficulty in 
defining the stages of transition between peace and war is reflected in disagreements within 
international law regarding the definition of "ceasefire."  The term was used neither in the Hague 
Convention (1907), nor in any major works on international law of armed conflict, such Greenspan 
(1959) or Schwarzenberger (1968). Only with the creation of the United Nations was the term 
"ceasefire" distinguished from "truce" of "armistice” (Mohn 1950). Truce can be distinguished from 
ceasefire in that a truce involves stabilization or strengthening of a ceasefire. Armistice can also be 
distinguished  from ceasefire since it may only be local in character.  For the purpose of this paper, 
Smith's (1995: 266) definition has been adopted: “A cease-fire is an implemented agreement 
between belligerents (either explicit or implicit), involving all or the greater part of their military 
forces to, at a minimum, abjure the use of violent force with regard to each other, for a period of 
time (not necessarily specified) regardless of the intention for doing so, and regardless of the 
eventual outcome of such agreement." 
2  Generally, “Republicans” tend to be Catholic and are sometimes mistakenly referred to as 
such.  “Loyalists,” though the name denotes a political view that is not dependent on religious 
affiliation, are often called Protestants. “Unionists” seek to maintain political unity with Great 
Britain. 
3  The material gain theory, for example Gordon (1987), seems particularly unlikely 
considering the poverty of Northern Ireland. The British government derived no obvious economic 
benefit from its ties with Northern Ireland, although it is likely there were certain military, strategic 
and political benefits.  The soldiers who patrolled West Belfast learned invaluable tactical lessons; 
operations during the Falklands War benefited from the training ground of Northern Ireland.  In light 
of the political neutrality of the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland also provided an invaluable 
strategic position for NATO air and sea operations in the North Atlantic during the Cold War 
(Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies 1994). Similarly, the Republican community 
derived no material benefits from the war that would encourage its continuation. According to Gerry 
Adams (1995:65): "If the life of an IRA volunteer was a career, one might be able to talk about 
people who wanted to keep the war going rather than lose their livelihoods, but there is not even that 
mercenary element.” 
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4  Commentators such as Byrne and Carter (1996) and Byrne (1995) have argued that we 
need to take note of the role of ethnic identity in the competing attachment of two opposing ethnic 
communities to the same territory.  The point of this paper is somewhat different: that cultures 
contain internal mechanisms or social values that may, under the right circumstances, serve to 
sustain or produce conflict. 
5  Republicanism is just one subtype of nationalism in Northern Ireland. The Social 
Democratic Labor Party (SDLP), the largest nationalist group in Northern Ireland, has views that are 
dissimilar to those of Republicans.  While Republicans see British occupation as the bar to 
unification, leftist social democrats pinpoint the problematic relationship of unionists and 
nationalists as a bar to reunification.  Guelke (1988) makes the point that the international 
community views the partitioned territory of Northern Ireland as illegitimate. 
6  “Necrophilic” in this context can be taken to mean a strong, abiding fascination with death 
and with the political martyrdom of Republican figures like Padraig Pearse and Bobby Sands.  
Commentators have noticed that blood-letting in the Republican tradition has a redeptive quality 
(Feehan 1986).  For background on the hungerstrike see Beresford (1987). 
7  On the history of British military operations in Northern Ireland, see Dewar (1985). 
8  The delicate process of preventing escalation and avoiding international disapproval forced 
the war underground.  By the late 1980's the conflict centered on undercover operations, informants 
and a mutual, informal shoot-to-kill code of combat between PIRA and British Army Special Forces 
(Urban 1992). 
9  Loyalists fear that if Ireland is united, the nine hundred thousand Protestants in the north 
would become a minority among the three million Catholics in the Republic of Ireland. 
10  For example, when in May 1974 the British labour government proposed a Council of 
Ireland, the (Protestant) Ulster Workers Council began a strike that shut down all activity in Ulster.  
As a result of the strike, the Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont collapsed and London assumed 
governance of the province (O'Malley 1990: 228).  The Home Rule bills of 1893, 1912 and 1913 
were also violently resisted by Ulster Protestants. 
11  Wars are typically defined by authors in the field as those with more than one-thousand 
combat deaths per year (Pillar 1983; Small and Singer 1982: 12).  Northern Ireland and other such 
low-intensity conflicts thus fall outside of the parameters of the studies. 
12  The cease-fire in Northern Ireland challenges a fundamental assumption of conflict 
resolution theory: that wars end because they cannot be sustained. This idea emerges out of the 
military history of pre-nineteenth century Europe, when most wars ended with a decisive military 
victory or when victory became militarily or financially inconceivable. Statistical data suggests that 
modern wars, with the exception of the Gulf War and the Falklands War, have not ended in a 
decisive military victory.  Rather, they tend to result in a stalemate with an ambivalent relationship 
between the belligerents (Pillar 1983: 16-21; Dunnigan and Martel 1987: 207-262).  Dunnigan and 
Martel's data indicate that in 85.7% of wars between 1975-1983 stalemate was considered to be the 
decisive factor in ending the war. 
13  The conflict in Northern Ireland challenges other assumptions in cease-fire theory which 
are beyond the scope of this paper.  Wars are assumed to be temporary aberrations in the political 
life of nations that must and will eventually come to a halt when the belligerents have the political 
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will to do so. In Northern Ireland, the basic assumption that wars are temporary needs to be carefully 
considered. 
14  Quantitative studies have attempted to determine the relationship between casualties, force 
ratios and the duration of wars in order to predict when wars end (Small and Singer 1982).   The data 
do not associate any threshold level of combat deaths with cessation of war, and there may in fact be 
a negative correlation between length of wars and battle deaths per capita per month  (Wittman 
1979). In other words, the fewer the deaths, the longer the war. 
15   Key sections of the document included the recognition by the British of an Irish right to 
self-determination, the end of partition and transfer of sovereignty to an all-Ireland government who 
would be democratically selected by the people, the use of British authority to influence Unionist 
opinion, and consultation between London and Dublin to set policy objectives of ending partition 
(Adams 1995: 209). 
16   PIRA denied ever sending this message.  This may, in fact, be true since the messages 
were transmitted orally, rather than in written form (Sinn Féin 1994b; MLR Smith 1995: 201). 
According to Pillar (1983: 67), the pervasive notion that an initial offer to negotiate is 'suing for 
peace' leads governments to resist making such offers for fear of being considered the defeated 
party." 
17  Such attacks included a bomb explosion at an army checkpoint in Keady on May 15, 1994 
that killed a British soldier.  On May 21 in Armagh, the Provisional IRA abducted, interrogated and 
executed Reggie McCollum, a private from the Royal Irish Regiment.  McCollum was the third 
member of his family killed by Republicans.  These attacks may have been intended to show the pre-
ceasefire strength of PIRA, but other attacks were long-intended and had very specific targets.  On 
July 11, 1994, Ray Smallwoods, a notorious former paramilitary from the Ulster Democratic Party, 
was assassinated in Lisburn and two members of the Ulster Freedom Fighters, Joe Bratty and 
Raymond Elder killed on July 31 in Belfast.  Additionally, after many attempts, PIRA finally did 
shoot down a British Lynx helicopter on March 19 in Crossmaglen with a mortar shell. 
18  The statement issued by the Combined Loyalist Military Command said: “In the belief 
that the democratically expressed wishes of the greater number of people in Northern Ireland will be 
respected and upheld, the Combined Loyalist Military Command will universally cease all 
operational hostilities as from 12 midnight, Thursday Oct. 13, 1994” (Combined Loyalist Military 
Command 1994). 
19  According to Martin McGuinness,  "Against the backdrop of no IRA attacks against 
British forces, you have a situation where they are free to deal with these people within the Loyalist 
community who would embark on rampages . . . but that's not to say you won't have outbreaks of 
violence.” (Kiernan 1994: 1).  In stark contrast to the traditional Republican view of the British 
Army as collaborating with Unionists, McGuinness' statement indicates that Republicans now 
expected British security forces to protect the Republican community from Loyalist violence. 
20  Sinn Fein gathered more than fifteen percent of the vote, a record high. The outlawed 
Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Defence Association polled six percent of the vote.  This 
election indicated that twenty-one percent of the vote in Northern Ireland supported political parties 
advocating violence. 
21  The Agreement also included a provision for co-operative council between Northern 
Ireland and the Republic to consult, co-operate and act within the island of Ireland. 
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22  As of November, 1998 over two hundred and twenty prisoners, about half of those 
eligible, have been freed.  Prisoners from the following organizations are ineligible for early release: 
The Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), The Real Irish Republican Army, The Irish National 
Liberation Army (INLA) and the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF).  Despite the fact that PIRA is not 
co-operating with the decommissioning body and punishment attacks have continued, PIRA 
prisoners have been released. 
23  Another school of thought views cease-fire as a status quo in which belligerents are not 
allowed to take advantage of the calm for military gain.  During the conflict in Palestine, the UN 
Security Council resolved on August 19, 1948 that "no party is entitled to gain military or political 
advantage through violation of the truce" (Smith 1995: 18). 
24  Pillar (1983: 111) notes that cease-fires are generally unsuccessful if  "each side proposed 
placing all the military obligations on the enemy while assuming none itself." 
25  Finally, neither Sinn Fein nor PIRA have much influence with other hard-line paramilitary 
groups, such as the INLA or the IPLO.  These organizations operate independently, and thus far 
have been cooperating with the cease-fire.  The INLA declared a "tactical rather than permanent" 
cease-fire on May 5, 1995. 
26  The Executive elects the seven-person Army Council, which is the main decision making 
body of PIRA. 
27  In addition to receiving covert support from PIRA members dissatisfied with the peace 
process, RIRA has worked with the two other Republican groups opposed to the peace process: the 
Continuity IRA (CIRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), which called a ceasefire 
after the Omagh massacre.  For an excellent summary, see Boyne (1998). 
28  In McGimpsey v. Ireland, constitutional questions were raised regarding the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement.  Article 1(a) affirms "that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come 
about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland."  The plaintiffs argued that 
because the Anglo-Irish Agreement effectively recognized the legitimacy of the present 
constitutional arrangements in Northern Ireland, it violated Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution 
which exert a claim over Northern Ireland as part of the "national territory."  Furthermore, the 
"consent clause" of the Agreement was challenged, insofar as it was argued that Ireland had entered 
into a Treaty whereby it committed itself to obtaining the consent of one section of the Irish nation, 
while disregarding the interests of the majority (e.g., the population of the Irish Republic).  The Irish 
Supreme Court held that the Anglo-Irish Agreement was not inconsistent with Article 2 and 3 of the 
Constitution, but merely "constitutes a recognition of the de facto situation in Northern Ireland ... 
without abandoning the claim to the re-integration of national territory." 
29  The Omagh atrocity, which seemed to be designed to frustrate the peaceful aims of PIRA 
and Sinn Fein, could have easily provoked a feud between PIRA and the Real IRA. In the past, this 
type of unauthorized military action often resulted in bloodshed. Another sensitive issue was the 
theft of PIRA arms and war material by the Real IRA.  Misappropriation of weapons is considered to 
be a capital offense by PIRA.  The fact that there was not a feud indicates that the northern 
leadership of Sinn Fein and the Army Council successfully restrained the more militant factions in 
PIRA. 
30  Michael Collins was a figure central to the Irish Civil War.  At the end of the Anglo-Irish 
War, Collins took a pragmatic pro-Treaty view, believing that the Treaty was the only concession 
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that the British could offer in 1921.  Nevertheless, Collins was determined to protect the Republicans 
in the north from Protestant anti-Nationalists.  Despite the fact that he had become a minister in the 
newly formed government of the Republic of Ireland, Collins carried out military operations against 
British forces along the border.  At this time, a series of pogroms were being carried out in the 
North, and these were widely considered to be the work of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, ex-
Chief of the Imperial General Staff and current military advisor of the Unionist government in 
Belfast.  Wilson, a vehement anti-Nationalist, was killed in London on the order of Michael Collins 
by the IRB.  Wilson's "killing was the pretext that finally tumbled the two Sinn Fein factions into 
Civil War" (Cronin 1980: 151). Collins was assassinated in 1922. 
31  It should be noted that the “Irish Republic,” which is a nation waiting to be born, is not the 
“Republic of Ireland,” which is a nation born following the Anglo-Irish war. 
32  This is almost identical to clause twenty of the Constitution of the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood:  “The Supreme Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood is hereby declared in fact, 
as well as by right, the sole Government of the Irish Republic." 
33  Believing themselves the legitimate government of Ireland, the Provisionals claim a 
mandate to declare war against Great Britain. 
34  Although it may seem that the tail is wagging the dog, the Provisional IRA's physical force 
tradition not only established the Republic of Ireland, but has assured the continuity and preservation 
of the movement for at least a century (or eight centuries, depending on when one begins counting).  
The ideology of Republicanism is also remarkably consistent: Seamas Twomey, former commander 
of the Belfast Brigade of PIRA in the 1970's and Gerry Adam's predecessor as Chief of Staff, 
summed up the basic ideology of Republicanism very simply: "Our first prime and main objective is 
the unification of our country.  This means getting the British out of the occupied part of the country. 
 After that the whole system in North and South would have to be changed” (Cronin 1980: 214). 
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PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 
AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 
 
Amr G. E. Sabet 
 
Peace as Cant 
 
Once upon a time, as the story goes, 
 
there was a bear who was hungry and a man who was cold, so they 
decided to negotiate in a neutral cave. After several hours a settlement 
was reached. When they emerged the man had a fur coat and the bear was 
no longer hungry (Karrass, 1970: 3). 
 
The saga of the Middle East ‘peace process’ and the fanfare that has surrounded it, obscured 
the fact that little has been subjected to detailed systematic and objective analysis. Nor has it been 
sufficiently put to the test of negotiation principles in a fashion that would shed light on its 
underlying nature and substance. This caveat hindered addressing important questions regarding the 
very structure of the process and its ability to deliver on its purported promises. It further raises 
questions as to whether one could speak of a real peace in the making, or whether the whole 
endeavor is merely used as cant. By cant is meant “a mode of expression, or a cast of thought, of 
which the effect--irrespective of the motive--is to create a misleading discrepancy between the 
natural meaning of words and their practical significance...” (Hugo, 1970: 19). 
In order to understand the full implications and underpinnings of regional politics it is crucial 
to reintroduce some basics of the Arab-Israeli conflict which, have been lost or concealed in the 
maze of peace proclamations. This should not be construed as an attempt at rehashing the polemics, 
arguments and counter-arguments of the past five decades or so, but rather as a bid to expose the 
structural flaws connected with the policies devised to deal with the current regional predicament. A 
careful diagnosis helps in anticipating the patient’s prognosis. 
The origin of the Arab-Israeli conflict goes back to the early part of the twentieth century. 
The Zionist movement, founded by Theodore Herzl in the late 1890s, was able to elicit a promise 
from the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, committing “His Majesty’s Government” to the 
“establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people...” (Heikal, 1996: 28-29).1 Brief 
statements made by two major figures involved in the Zionist Jewish state project, serve as an 
exemplary of the genesis and stakes of the conflict: the aforementioned Arthur Balfour and David 
Ben-Gurion the first Prime Minister of the newly created state of Israel. Admitting in a 
memorandum to cabinet colleagues in 1919, that the Palestinians had been deceived, Balfour 
attributed the deception to the “Big Four” powers (the US, France, Britain, and Italy), rather than to 
Britain alone. He stated: “so far as Palestine is concerned, the powers have made no statement of fact 
that is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not 
always intended to violate” (Heikal, 1996: 30). As for Ben-Gurion, he stated in 1938:  
 
  
When we say that the Arabs are the aggressors and we defend ourselves-
that is only half the truth. As regards our security and life we defend 
ourselves.... But the fighting is only one aspect of the conflict which is in 
its essence a political one. And politically we are the aggressors and they 
defend themselves (Finkelstein, 1995: 108). 
 
Reverting to the basics of the Arab-Israeli conflict allows us not to lose sight of the politics 
of injustice as an inherent source of antagonisms. The moral foundations of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
do not simply lie in the realm of competing perceptions, but in veracity and justice. Its essence, as 
Balfour’s and Ben-Gurion’s words clearly suggest, is born in a historical injustice inflicted rather 
than in a current violence perpetrated against the Palestinians. Not in a conflict between two rights, 
as Albert Einstein has philosophized, but a situation in which one party is clearly an aggressor and 
the other a victim.2 To frame the matter differently would sound reminiscent of Harry Truman’s 
cynical aphorism “if you can’t convince them, confuse them.” 
In order for such politics not to constitute the sown seeds of a future more violent and bitter 
collision, an important analytical distinction must be made between conflict resolution and 
settlement. The former refers to “the transformation of relationships in a particular case by the 
solution of the problems which, led to the conflictual behavior in the first place.“ The latter 
designates “the suppression of … conflict by coercive means, or by bargaining and negotiation in 
which relative power determines the outcome“ (Burton, 1990: 3). Resolution must incorporate the 
principle of Justice, the salience of which has made the Palestinian issue the core of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Otherwise, it would simply collapse into a reduced settlement arrangement. 
 
Peace Transformation and the Politics of Injustice 
The ‘peace’ process has attempted to circumvent, transform, and conceptually obliterate the 
true nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict by resorting to conventional Western conflict resolution and 
power politics mechanisms. These mechanisms fundamentally altered the political agenda of the 
conflict through subterfuge and issue transformation, imposing and maintaining an asymmetric 
power relationship in favor of the Arabs’ adversary. A development facilitated by systemic and 
regional changes arising from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Second Gulf War and the 
destruction of Iraq, and American-Israeli military and scientific cooperation. Superordinate axes 
were introduced in order to change the regime of alliances. For the purposes of creating overlapping 
space, ‘moderate’ Arab and Jewish forces supporting ‘peace’ were supposedly to be aligned against 
‘radicals’ or ‘extremists’ across both societies, opposing it. A closed Arab agenda would have set 
Islamists and incumbent regimes, at least in principle, as natural allies against a common Israeli 
enemy. Arab governments instead, have sought to establish common cause with Israel in fighting 
Islamic resistance to such open concessional schemes. This open agenda evolved into one of 
confronting the effects of injustice rather than its causes, changing the political constellation 
supporting the original principles and re-connecting interests in a fashion that cuts across closed 
foundational considerations. 
Back in January 1989, President Hosni Mubarak (1995) of Egypt proclaimed that he and 
other Arab leaders were supported in their search for peace, among other actors, by “the peace 
loving forces in Israel itself.” To make his starting point clear, he indicated that after all the 
sacrifices due to previous wars with Israel, he “was not ready to take more risks” (Mubarak, 1995: 
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546-547). In one stroke, Mubarak was acknowledging the conflict to be one of costs rather than of 
entitlements, conveying a willingness to play by the rules of the opponent rather than his own. A less 
than inspiring overture from someone engaged in a protracted and gruesome process of conflict 
management. Expressing his rather limited understanding of the Vietnamese case as an example of a 
war that “was settled only through negotiations,” Mubarak failed to relate the outcome to the 
conditions on the ground and from there on draw the relevant conclusions. The Vietnamese had been 
willing to take risks and consequently were successful in imposing their will on a much more 
powerful adversary.  
According to Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, inferior power is not in and of itself the most 
important determinant of outcome. Resolve plays an extremely important role as well. “The military 
inferiority of one party may be compensated by its greater interests engaged, thus making the parties 
equally resolved. A militarily stronger party may be less ‘resolved’ in the crisis than its opponent if 
it does not value its interests as highly as the opponent values his” (Snyder & Diesing, 1977: 498). 
Exacerbating their military inferiority by translating it into a lack of determination, the Arab party’s 
starting point to negotiations conversely, was to concede entitlement claims from the very outset. 
For to recognize Israel, is invariably to recognize the right to dispossess the Palestinians and to 
occupy Arab land in defense of such dispossession. This gradual yet steady concessionary Arab 
behavior served implicitly and/or explicitly to self-condemn earlier policies and stances adopted vis-
a-vis Israel, and to undermine the justice principle. In essence, the Arabs arrived at a situation in 
which they became susceptible to recognizing their values to be, if not wrong, then at least faulty. 
Since at a point they became actually willing to relinquish what they had considered sacred for the 
past five decades or so, further pressure, so the justified expectation would be, may lead them to 
concede other rights and Jerusalem as well. The late king Hasan of Morocco and president to the 
Jerusalem Committee, for instance, had indicated that Jerusalem constituted to the Arabs nothing 
more than the sacred sites, such as “Al-Aqsa Mosque” (Hasan, 1999: 172). Statements of the kind 
undermine rights to land restoration and liberation. 
Such precedents introduced structural transformations capable of concomitantly changing the 
psychological distribution of power heavily in favor of Israel. It emasculated the Arab position, first 
and foremost at this level, from defiance to one of virtual submission. Their practical manifestations 
include the degradation of religious consciousness, which is necessary if Jerusalem is to be 
compromised, moral and spiritual decadence in order for people to forsake values such as Jihad and 
the undermining of national and historical self-confidence so as to justify defeatism. Together with 
the media and mind-altering changes in Arab educational systems, they came to constitute what 
President Clinton has termed “education for peace.” As a settlement mechanism the ‘peace’ process, 
has recast the substance of the conflict by steadily creating the appropriate environmental means-
ends framework for such ‘concessions’ to be made.  
Negotiation constitutes the “art of the dialectics of wills that use force (and/or peaceful 
measures) to resolve their conflict” (Luttwak, 1987: 241). Strategies, tactics and skill, in addition to 
options and resources available, constitute the pillars of its dynamics. Their overriding principle is 
for one side to take advantage, to the extent possible, of the adversary’s weaknesses, loopholes, and 
oversights. The outcome configuration largely determines the privileged or non-privileged 
translations of any proposed agreements, and heavily influences the subsequent order of events. In 
this sense, negotiation is a double- edged sword. It may resolve conflicts or it may exacerbate them. 
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Setting detailed blueprints or axioms predictive of the ensuing results of a negotiating process 
therefore, is by no means an easy task. It is important nevertheless, to underscore the inter-linked 
premises that “where one ends up depends on where one starts” (Raiffa, 1982: 215); that the final 
outcome of negotiations usually reflects the relative power configuration of the parties concerned 
and; that negotiating outcomes not only emanate from objective material conditions, but as 
importantly, from subjective psychological fortitude. Thus, the weaker side in particular must exhibit 
a good measure of steadfastness in order to establish a credibility threshold for any demands made or 
positions upheld. Otherwise, diminished will power would inevitably translate into a one sided open 
agenda in which--as far as the privileged party is concerned--agreement may not necessarily be 
preferred to non-agreement. Unequal costs emanating from a failure to agree, together with an 
asymmetric capability to modify the reference structure, constitute two determining factors of 
negotiation outcomes. This is especially so in as far as they reflect not simply an imbalance in power 
resources but also in “control relations.” As a reflection of structural asymmetry, they allow for the 
unilateral alteration of the rules of the game and for redefining the norms which all actors are 
expected to follow in their mutual relations (Hopmann, 1978: 143; Vayrynen, 1991: 4-5). Once this 
stage has been reached, it substantively ceases to be negotiation since, “the weak,“ to quote Henry 
Kissinger, “do not negotiate” (Finkelstein, 1995: 237). 
Both the Americans and the Israelis believed that a preliminary step-by-step negotiating 
approach, rather than a comprehensive one, would contribute to undermining the famous Arab 
consensus, agreed at the Khartoum summit in August 1967, of “no talks, no recognition, no peace” 
(Field, 1994: 384). The purpose was to divide the Arab World, win de facto recognition of a few 
countries and put the Israelis in a stronger position when they came to negotiate directly with the 
front-line states and the Palestinians. The idea behind such a strategy which, underscored 
Kissinger’s negotiating style, was to build “positions of strength with an active diplomacy pressing 
for settlement” (Kissinger, 1994: 467ff). Israel’s tactics as Yehoshafat Harkabi (1977: 103) had 
alluded to as early as 1977, was to bring the Arabs into “... step by step, practical settlements and 
interim agreements as a gradual incremental process of ‘interlocking’ the rivals into positive 
arrangements which may make it more difficult for them to revert to open conflict and war.”3 Or in a 
more recent statement by a British diplomat, which mirrors the same position, to create “a complex 
architecture of Arab-Israeli connections... that will not be easily demolished” (Field, 1994: 368). 
Such tactics were consistent with the overall strategy of detaching Egypt from the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, isolating Syria, and cantonizing the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Above all, 
they have succeeded in breaking the necessary link between statecraft and war. Once all this had 
been achieved, Israel reversed its position, with the former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu calling for “a package approach“ that circumvents earlier agreements made (1997a: 39). 
 
The Peace-Justice Dialectics 
Power relations based on considerations of order and might frequently offend the “sense of 
justice,” and cannot but fuel the emotions of resentment, anger, and tension which, ultimately lead to 
violence. Notions of injustice, as a backlash against perceived disparities between prerogatives and 
benefits, always remain an inherent and perpetual risk factor (Lerner, 1981: 12-13). 'Peace,' merely 
as the opposite of violence rather than as a reflection of justice is unlikely to overcome or rectify 
such concerns. Injustices inflicted by the Western colonial legacy on the Arabs in general and the 
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Palestinians in particular have characterized the nature of the conflict from its very inception as one 
of entitlements-benefits. The erupting sense of injustice triggered intense and unique emotional 
responses which, could not be quantified solely in terms of tangible indices or reduced simply to an 
aversion of loss and an appetite for gain. Phenomenologically “it engage(d) powerful passions that 
have the effect of increasing the stridency of demands, amplifying intransigence, reducing sensitivity 
to threats and value trade-offs, increasing the willingness to run risks, and increasing the likelihood 
of violent behavior” (Welch, 1993: 20). This helps explain the drive behind the martyrdom 
bombings perpetrated by Islamic militant organizations such as Hamas, Hizbollah and Jihad, and 
allows putting their militancy in perspective. Their actions largely constitute the observable 
symptoms of the unobservable motivation and need to respond to group insult with rage (Burton, 
1984: 13). Referring to these organizations as terrorist structures opposing peace comprises an 
altering discursive mechanism which seeks to eliminate the entitlement-benefits discrepancy context 
in favor of one re-constructed and based on cost-benefits.  The former then is depicted as irrational 
and the latter as rational. Historical experiences however, show that when basic entitlements are at 
stake against overwhelming odds, less rationality is needed, and actually fares better, than more 
rationality. For instance, the Czechs’ behavior with respect to Nazi Germany’s demands on their 
land, in Michael Handel’s (1981: 91) words, was “too rational“ in response to a military threat they 
believed they could not win out against in the long run. This was in stark contrast to the Finns and 
the North Vietnamese who were less calculating, more emotional, and more determined to fight 
against the overwhelming powers of both the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. The 
Finns, while losing twice, earned respect and admiration and perhaps made themselves less attractive 
as potential satellites. In the case of the North Vietnamese, they ultimately prevailed and won a war 
in which they virtually had lost all the battles. One can not help but wonder what the outcome might 
have been had the Vietnamese, alternatively like the Arabs, started doubting themselves. The 
constructed ‘peace’ discourse, based on such self-doubts, makes it immensely easier for the 
Americans and Israelis to manipulate parties whose strategic calculations can be transformed toward 
cost-benefit quantification (the Czech option). This as opposed to actors who consciously adhere to 
their own strategic imperatives, irrespective of costs (the Finnish or Vietnamese option). The former 
constitutes a strategic victory, the latter a strategic challenge.  
The justice motive differs from loss aversion or appetite for gain in two further respects: 
prescriptively and extensively. Prescriptively, the very desire to see justice done ‘though the earth 
may perish’ is a very strong drive embedded in basic and non-negotiable human needs and values. 
This sets them in stark contrast to material valuations based on economy or self-interest. 
Extensively, it does not overreach to what people simply would like to have, but rather to what they 
consider to be their entitlements. In this respect, it is categorical and demanding of nothing less than 
full satisfaction. People within the entitlement-benefits value matrix are usually willing to incur a 
heavy price for potentially less useful things they consider a matter of right. They are also more 
willing to trade-off or forswear pursuing goods which, they would like to have but to which they do 
not necessarily feel particularly entitled.  “The mode of reasoning involved in the defense of one’s 
entitlements,“ therefore, “differs fundamentally from the mode of reasoning involved in the pursuit 
of other goods: it tends to be categorical and deontological rather than utilitarian” (Welch, 1993: 20-
21). 
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Substantively, Israel with the aid of American indifference if not complicity, attempted to 
reconcile the entitlement-benefits discrepancy. This was done not by meeting Palestinian legitimate 
demands for statehood, but by transforming the rules in a fashion that would increasingly lead the 
Palestinian Authority, headed by Yasser Arafat, to act--if not actually believe--as if it has 
misconceived the scope and content of Palestinian entitlements (Welch, 1993: 20). According to 
Harkabi (1977: 88), “making the opponent uneasy and apologetic about his objective, is a first small 
step in the process of its erosion, inducing him to start discarding it.” 
The expectations of the Palestinian negotiator presumably anticipated a Palestinian state at 
the end of the road. The pattern of negotiations it followed, however, appears in all practicalities to 
have reduced the Palestinian Authority (PA) to nothing more than an auxiliary Israeli security 
structure. Israel’s further de-linking of security matters from changes taking place on the ground in 
Jerusalem and the West Bank and therefore from the political heart of the ‘peace’ process, reflected 
the divesting of the purported Palestinian/Arab negotiating formula. Israel continues to maintain its 
own constants and payoffs in terms of a unified Jerusalem under its control, entitlement to most of 
the West Bank (notwithstanding redeployment maneuverings), monopolized access to nuclear 
weapons, priority of its security concerns over all other considerations, and eventual access to the 
water resources of the River Nile and the Euphrates (Lesch, 1992: 158).4  
America’s rather explicit recognition of the legitimacy of this agenda was manifested most 
conspicuously by the Congress’s vote (even if non-binding) to transfer the US embassy to Jerusalem 
by 1999. US envoy Dennis Ross’ statements, during his August 1997 visit to the region, in the wake 
of bombings in Jerusalem by Hamas militants, attempted to further entrench the Palestinian 
negotiator within this de-linking structure. He called upon Israelis and Palestinians to work as 
partners against a “common threat” from militants, and emphasized that “security is something that 
serves Israeli interests and Palestinian interests...” (Goller, 1997: A15). Israeli security was to 
become the Palestinian Authority’s own, irrespective of whether or not Palestinian demands for 
statehood can or will be met. In return for Arafat’s resumption of security cooperation with Israel to 
rein in Islamic militants, a vague promise was given by Ross of an upcoming broad US peace 
initiative. Supposedly it was to address Palestinians' complaints against Israel, including reportedly, 
some kind of freeze on Israeli expansion of colonies (conveniently termed settlements), and an 
acceleration of talks on a final peace settlement (Assad, 1997). However, American Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright’s response during her subsequent visit to the region in September 1997, to 
complaints that Israel was strengthening its grip on Jerusalem, expanding Jewish colonies and 
leveling the homes of Palestinians, was unequivocal. “There is no moral equivalent,” she stated 
“between killing people and building houses.... The Palestinian Authority must take unilateral steps 
and actions to root out the terrorist infrastructure” (Schweid, 1997). The problem with unilateral 
gestures as Kissinger (1994: 488) has indicated, is that they “remove a key negotiating asset. In 
general, diplomats rarely pay for services already rendered...” Moreover, they tempt the adversary 
“...to drag out the negotiations in order to determine whether other unilateral gestures may be 
forthcoming.” Not only that, but Albright was also making the connection between militant acts and 
the peaceful process of building houses, rather than to the breaking of agreements and Israeli 
colonial expansion. In as far as she was interested in accomplishing any significant results, it was to 
call for holding financial contributions to Islamist groups, and to cajole Arab regimes into attending 
the upcoming economic conference to be held in Doha, Qatar, in November of that year. Ross’ 
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earlier promises--and for that matter any upcoming ones--to Arafat are unlikely to be any different 
from the British WWI superfluous offerings to give Arabs their independence in exchange for 
support in the war effort against Ottoman Turkey. In essence, nothing has been learned, nothing has 
been forgotten. 
Arafat’s relationship with Islamist groups is significantly complex to allow for the above 
demands to be conceded, at least in their US-Israeli ideal. Much as he would like to clamp down on 
their infrastructure, he remains strongly constrained as to how far he could go. In many ways, his 
fate has become intertwined with their own to the extent that by destroying them he could virtually 
be committing political suicide. Eradicating Hamas and Jihad could greatly diminish the need for his 
presence as a party altogether. When newspaper photos had depicted Arafat embracing Hamas 
figures, they were basically showing him holding to his last trump card. This is where the inherent 
contradictions of a common security framework can be most strongly felt. The major caveat is that 
while the Israelis would like to see Islamic opposition eradicated, the most that Arafat could do, if 
for no other reason than to ensure his own survival, is to contain and weaken but not eliminate them. 
The logical outcome is that both the PA and Israel can only pursue a parallel rather than a common 
security policy. This poses Arafat’s dilemma. It serves to project him both as a collaborator, to many 
Palestinians, and as an ineffective and uncooperative ‘negotiator,’ as the US and the Israelis allege. 
Such an ambivalent outcome could only lead to the eventual erosion of the PA’s legitimacy, forcing 
it to control its own people by increasingly coercive measures. As Glenn E. Robinson (1997: 54) has 
stated, “...PLO failure to deliver Palestinian rights will compel the PA to tighten the noose around its 
own society. Open politics in the midst of national failure is not a recipe for regime survival.” It 
should come as no surprise therefore that Arafat would accept internal security guardianship by the 
CIA on his people through the Wye River agreements. 
Israeli security officers further have warned that enfeebling Arafat could open the door for 
Hamas to achieve political dominance in Gaza and parts of the West Bank (Drozdiak, 1997b: A14). 
Capitalizing on such a trade-off, Arafat continues to project himself as the one most capable of 
controlling and possibly coopting those groups. In as much as the Israelis may loathe him, he stands 
as the best of two evils. Arafat has become an Israeli interest and safety valve. His rumblings that he 
will not be dictated to by Israel do not hide his real concern. The Washington Post, referring to 
statements made by Palestinian officials, has indicated that he remains constrained by the fear of 
generating sympathy for Islamic militants by acquiescing to Israeli demands (Drozdiak, 1997a: 
A01). His holding of “national unity” talks, during the latter half of August 1997, and then again 
with other dissenting Palestinian groups in September 1999, simply aimed at bringing militants into 
the political process as a way to dilute their influence and persuade them to abandon their actions 
and opposition. This reflected a typical pattern of political cooptation reminiscent of Egyptian 
President Sadat’s policies toward Islamist opposition and which ultimately proved fatal for him. 
Furthermore, Arafat continues to concentrate power in his hands. While attempting to weaken all 
other forces and/or rudimentary social institutions (most of which have an Islamic identity), as is 
being demanded by the Israeli side, he continues to personally control money offered by 
international donors. With virtually no accountability, Arafat in all but name has become the PA 
(Robinson, 1997: 45). This significantly consolidates the position of the Israeli negotiator who by 
constructing control structures to ‘handle’ the PA ‘chief’ could indirectly ‘administer’ the ‘tribe’ as 
well. A virtual situation is thus created in which the grand strategy of one side is in effect being 
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tackled in the framework of personal, tribal and ‘fiefdom’ politics, by the Arab side. Though short of 
a state, the PA is not an aberration but rather a typical regional structure, where it only takes control 
of the leader to dominate the hierarchical socio-political configuration.  
 
Peace Concessions and the Strategy of Defeat 
Empirical studies regarding winners and losers in negotiations have indicated that parties 
with higher aspiration levels and wanting more, actually did get more. In a conflictive non-
cooperative bargaining process, opponents with high aspirations, irrespective of their skill or power, 
ended up as winners in every case where they opposed low aspirants. They indicated furthermore, 
that negotiators who made the first compromise ended up being losers in the final outcome (Karrass, 
1970: 17-18 & 19). From the outset and as a reflection of collapse of will, the Egyptian side had 
declared itself desperate to opt out of confrontation. Since the Israeli side did not exhibit such 
desperation, it becomes clear that negotiation terms can only be strategically tilted in its favor, with 
the outcome most likely to reflect that condition. In light of such findings, it follows that the 
strategic concessions initiated by the late President Anwar Sadat through the Camp David regime, 
and in whose footsteps a number of other Arab leaders are following, can only lead to disastrous 
consequences for the Arab World. 
Such a pattern of concessions can never be fair or just to the Arabs due to several reasons. 
Firstly, concessions are fair only as long as the negotiators have no need to revise their original 
expectations about what the ultimate agreement will be or about their strategic goals of entitlement 
(Bartos, 1978: 22). Yet, while Mubarak’s chief political adviser Usama al-Baz conceded that the 
conflict between the Arabs and Israel was over boundaries and no longer over the latter’s existence, 
former Israeli chief of staff Raphael Eitan declared the Arab-Israeli conflict to be “civilizational“ 
(Kayhan al-Arabi, 1998: 11). This reflects a remarkable strategic turn of events in favor of the Israeli 
negotiator, confirming the conclusion that a negotiating opponent will concede in opposite 
proportion to the adversary's concession rate (Cross 1978: 29). 
Secondly, negotiation requires that parties be constrained by the same rules which, neither 
side have the right nor capability to alter unilaterally. If negotiation is a matter of finding the proper 
formula as a referent principle, and then implementing detail (Zartman 1978: 76-77), and if one 
party has the capability of changing it at will while the other is constrained by it, then no element or 
mechanism of joint decision-making does in reality exist. Both parties cease to share equal 
stalemating power, and the asymmetry is such that one party could at will alter the terms of the 
negotiating formula from land for peace as formulated at the Madrid conference in October 1991, to 
one of peace for peace or security for peace. Strictly speaking then, there are no negotiations taking 
place between the Arabs and the Israelis even as they continue to talk to each other. Israel’s formula 
alteration capability reorders the whole process in its own image against the opposite number, a 
strategic advantage that is unlikely to be thrown away whether the Likud party is in power or Labor. 
Yet, Arab negotiators continue to project the personalized nature of their own governance onto the 
‘other’ even when the Labor party had been doing by stealth what the Likud party implemented 
unpresumptuously.5 Negotiations in October 1999, between the Palestinian and the newly elected 
Israeli Labor government, which set security matters in the hands of the Israelis on the “safe 
passage” road linking Gaza to the Western Bank, actually constituted an additional Palestinian 
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concession to the security formula. This concession was more than could have been possible earlier 
during the incumbency of Likud’s conspicuously intransigent leadership. 
Such attitude reflects Arab susceptibility to (and naive entanglement into) the 
psychologically deceptive good-guy (Labor)/bad-guy (Likud) routine. Within this framework, two 
parties on the same side stage a quarrel related to seemingly opposed stances with respect to a 
common adversary. The good guy offers promises of reward if the opponent cooperates, the bad guy 
raises the specter of punishments if no ‘cooperation’ was forthcoming (Fisher & Ury, 1983: 141-
142). Arafat, during his appearance at the United Nations in October 1998, continued to hold to the 
belief that the assassinated Yitzhak Rabin was his partner in peace, and to lament his loss. This 
despite Kissinger’s statement that the latter had repeatedly brought it to his attention that should the 
‘incongruities’ of the Oslo agreements become pervasive, “he would initiate a strategic reassessment 
with all the greater determination because of a clear conscience” (Kissinger, 1997: C07). In between 
Labor (good guy) and Likud (bad guy) the psychological fabric of the target opponent is 
undermined, softening his will to the level of concessionary pliance in order to escape emotional 
distress. Any semblance of concession offered by the good guy would then be seen as a big favor to 
be reciprocated with a supposedly sizable concession lest ammunition be provided to alternative 
‘radical or extremist’ forces. A dynamic of escalating demands for every concession offered, not 
necessarily made, is thus introduced into the negotiating framework.6 Arab negotiators should not 
act perplexed as they come to face this situation with a Labor negotiator.  
A dual routine of this kind, one should add, requires formal autonomous domestic 
institutional structures which, do not exist in the Arab world. One party to the negotiating table is 
capable of playing a game that the other side is structurally deprived off, and as such is at a constant 
disadvantage. Having been situated in an external rule structure the Arabs have come up against a no 
win situation. This applies whether they make one decision or its opposite. It should come as no 
surprise that Arafat has lost on both accounts when he continued to threaten to declare a Palestinian 
state in May 1999 only to back down as expected. To declare a state was simply to end up with a 
cluster of disparate villages beyond which he could make no further demands (assuming Israel does 
not respond by reentering the territory under PA authority). Having retracted however, he continues 
to lose much of his already shaky credibility not only with regard to his people, but also vis-a-vis the 
enemy. In strategic terms he has continuously and perpetually been placed on a ‘horn of a dilemma.’ 
Thirdly, geo-strategic considerations related to the very nature of the Zionist Jewish 
homeland project continue to play a determining role in the negotiation outcomes and the politics of 
concessions. In a superbly detailed and documented three volumes study about secret negotiations 
between the Arabs and Israel over the last hundred years or so, Mohamed Heikal (1996b: 27ff) 
illustrated that the idea of establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine hark back to the days of 
Napoleon Bonaparte’s French occupation of Egypt (1798-1801). This clearly was long before Herzl 
and the events of WW II. As part of his grand strategy, Napoleon believed that Egypt and Syria’s 
security, both being situated along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean 
respectively, were historically and strategically intertwined. In order to secure his power base in both 
countries, he believed that a foreign (Jewish) structure at their meeting point had to be created. The 
idea was to separate and prevent them from coming together in any form of common political 
framework. With the defeat of the Napoleonic armies this strategy was appropriated and actively 
pursued by Great Britain’s Lord Palmerston, during the first half of the 19th century onward. While 
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the reduction of the Palestinian issue to a matter of land and territory veiled the significance of this 
purpose, the Israeli negotiators could not but harbor it, albeit indirectly, as a strategic factor in their 
policy calculations. Responding to a question by Newsweek as to whether he envisions a Palestinian 
state, Netanyahu answered a categorical “no.” More interestingly, he added, “...I believe that the 
granting of unlimited self-determination would mean that we would face a Palestinian army with 
heavy weapons, a state that could make military pacts with countries like Iran or Iraq...” (Netanyahu, 
1997a: 39). Israel, he declared, “will not reduce itself to a fragile ghetto on the shores of the 
Mediterranean” (Netanyahu, 1997b: 13). Given that the envisioned Palestinian pseudo-state could 
hardly pose such a serious threat as Netanyahu claims, even if such pacts were presumably to be 
made, more must be read between the lines. The Israeli negotiator seems to be hinting that no mass 
of land, however small yet adequate enough to help re-establish the severed Egyptian-Levant 
strategic link, would be allowed. Implicitly underscored is not the issue of a reduced territorial size, 
which had actually sustained this state until 1967, but one of role as a link-severing structure. This 
attribute contributes to a large extent to Israel’s geo-strategic relevance. The Israeli negotiator is 
unlikely to accept a condition in which, the Jewish state could be by-passed or cut through. This 
after all, is what could turn Israel into a ghetto, and this is largely what will contribute to 
determining the Israeli position regarding a sovereign Palestinian state. Former Prime Minister and 
Labor Party leader Shimon Peres’ suggestion that Israel should be allowed to take the “reins of 
leadership in the Middle East” instead of Egypt was part and parcel of this consistent vision (Gerges, 
1995: 71). 
The coming of Ehud Barak to power brought little change despite the visible sigh of relief 
among Arab officials. In the same vein as his predecessor, he called for combining certain “parts” of 
the 1998 Wye River agreement with Oslo's final status negotiations. Not only that, but shortly after 
he had come to power, his government expanded colonies construction at a much faster pace than 
that of Netanyahu's (Al-Ahram, 1999a: 8). In addition, he declared that Jerusalem was to remain “the 
eternal and indivisible Capital” of the Jewish state and, that there would be no return to the pre-1967 
borders. He also rejected the return of Palestinian refugees to their homeland, and suggested only the 
possibility of a withdrawal “on” rather than “from” the Syrian heights. These positions were 
accompanied by a stream of statements declaring a commitment to peace, and even setting a year 
2000 deadline for an agreement (Usher, 1999). 
Finally, while any concessions that the Israeli side may offer or make can only be from gains 
and profits acquired at the expense of the Arab side, reciprocal concessions by the Arabs can only be 
offered from their own capital. A framework of mutual concessions while in appearance 
procedurally fair hides a substantive injustice inflicted on one negotiating party. If the claim is made 
that this is natural given the facts on the ground and that Israel has acquired Arab land by winning 
militarily, whatever the justifications may be, and that the strong do what they can and the weak 
suffer what they must, then the whole negotiating exercise becomes one in which the victor is 
basically imposing its will over the vanquished. This essentially, dissolves the very substance of 
negotiation and reduces it to one of how to yield the best surrender scenario. 
The Palestinian leader committed a serious strategic mistake when he conceded to interim 
agreements at the expense of postponing the fundamental issues of Jerusalem, the refugees, and the 
fate of Jewish colonies for future talks, (i.e. emphasizing the process of interaction rather than the 
content of the negotiated positions). In so doing he was following in Sadat's prenegotiation footsteps 
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when, together with Israel, both had sought to narrow the upcoming negotiation agenda to be 
undertaken at Camp David, by elimination or postponing the most controversial issues. The purpose 
was to reduce uncertainty and complexity and to lessen anticipated costs for Israel (Stein 1989b: 
255; Stein 1989a: & 174-205).7 Blunders of the kind were a reflection of the Arab/Palestinian 
negotiators’ inability to rank strategic priorities of collective national interests, goals and objectives, 
and their confusion of means and ends. Within the framework of a confidence building process as 
opposed to that of content, top priority tends to be credited to current and ad hoc problems as 
opposed to long term strategic considerations. Each and every concern as a result, becomes a matter 
of top priority to be addressed by the force of circumstances, basically propelling a policy of survival 
that renders equal importance to hierarchical issues. Strategies, however, must be set on a priority 
basis. If priorities are confused, which a framework based on process rather than content actually 
leads to, then no long term collective national interest strategy could be focused upon, nor could a 
decision about the channeling and commitment of resources be made. Process becomes an end in 
and of itself rather than the means it is supposed to be. This helps explain Barak’s call upon Syria to 
join the “peace of the brave” and Syria’s sober reluctance to do so. Syria’s approach reflects an 
astute awareness of the dimensions of the conflict, which go beyond land. Unlike Sadat and Arafat, 
Hafez Asad does not seem inclined in his pattern of negotiation to lose the whole (Syria) so as to 
bring back the part (the Golan heights) into his fold. 
Such loss of strategic balance is what has allowed Peres to acknowledge that at Oslo II Israel 
had in fact “screwed the Palestinians” (quoted by Chomsky 1996: 6). Whatever Western conflict 
management framework is put forth, Arabs can only emerge as losers. As Carl Schmitt (1976: 49) 
has observed, 
 
...as long as a people exists in the political sphere this people must, even 
if only in the most extreme case...determine by itself the distinction of 
friend and enemy. Therein resides the essence of its political existence. 
When it no longer possesses the capacity or the will to make this 
distinction, it ceases to exist politically. If it permits this decision to be 
made by another then it is no longer a politically free people and is 
absorbed into another political system. 
 
In ending the intifada and signing the Oslo accords Arafat gave up two of his most important 
trump cards without receiving anything of substance in return. His errors further lifted any 
embarrassment considerations standing in the way of other Arab and non-Arab countries 
normalizing and establishing relations with Israel. This effectively bolstered its regional and 
international status and ended its isolation. The PA winded up wasting the very limited leverage it 
might have had. In the process it placed itself in its enemy’s grip, and in that of its American ally, in 
much the same fashion, although under much worse conditions, as the Egyptian negotiator had done 
earlier.  
With the exception of the highly skilled Asad of Syria, a look at the behavioral 
characteristics of Arab decision-makers and their negotiating competence reveals a significant 
propensity to modify the values at stake in a fashion that ultimately challenges their own 
entitlements. This means that a pattern of unfair concessions is being made which will continue to 
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manifest loss of control over economic and political outcomes. An opened Arab agenda was, being 
unfairly reciprocated by a closed Israeli one. And while failure to match concessions may be a 
necessary though not sufficient condition of unfairness, the latter condition will inevitably exist if 
the opponent’s payoffs have not changed (Bartos, 1978: 22). Palestinian rights and demands for 
viable statehood are unlikely to go heeded or materialize since nothing in the negotiating pattern of 
the PA would allow for such an outcome. Parallel expectations on the broader Arab front, continue 
further, to decreasingly vary in light of their adversary’s initiative dynamics. Such concessionary 
patterns continue to undermine Arab political existence. 
 
The Politics of Peace Dialectics 
The key toward winning a negotiating outcome is to change the perception, and in the 
process, the stakes of the opponent. As a reflection of American thought logic and presumably their 
intent, I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman (1982) provided an example of two antagonists 
clashing over the same piece of land--without naming any specific parties. If ‘both’ parties’ 
perceptions could be changed, they reasoned, so as to convince them that it is the resources which 
the land holds that matter, then the two may be able to negotiate a deal whereby one can be the 
owner of the territory while the other shares in the benefits of the resources (Zartman & Berman, 
1982: 13). Translated into the ‘peace’ process context, Arab perceptions are to be changed in favor 
of remunerative incentives (e.g. through economic cooperation, joint economic projects, and aid), 
while Israel is to acquire the land and perhaps even, the water resources. Anis Mansour (1999), a 
columnist in Egypt’s Al-Ahram newspaper, for instance wrote that the countries of the Nile basin 
would not object to Egypt extending the Nile water to adjacent countries such as Israel, Palestine 
and Jordan if they were to be adequately paid, and if Egypt was to be remunerated for allowing 
water to pass through its territory (Mansour, 1999: 36).8 Since such statements are unlikely to be 
made nonchalantly, given the Egyptian social, economic and political scene, one can not but 
anticipate further concessions of the kind down the road. Especially so when they were published 
only one day after the same newspaper had disclosed an American commitment to Israel to assist it 
in accessing water resources from within the region (Al-Ahram, 1999b: 1 & 4). 
The whole issue is transformed from entitlement values to utilitarian calculations. The 
strategic cost of such a transformation would be tremendous. Rather than being the most powerful 
Nile basin country at its downstream, Egypt instead would be squeezed between a more powerful 
Israel (which would now become a Nile basin country!) in control both at downstream and at the 
source. This is not difficult to gauge if one is to closely observe the American-Israeli collaboration 
in the heart of Africa. Matters could be worse of course, if that state were to have commensurate 
access to the Euphrates. Israel would make economic, territorial and strategic strides, while the 
Arabs, notwithstanding some meager financial benefits, if any, would lose on all accounts.  
Much of the inherent failures of Arab decision-makers and negotiators arise from their lack 
of a solid and participating national constituency. Their perennial legitimacy crisis and personalized 
governing style inevitably reflects on their performance and conflict management competence. In his 
book Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, Boutros Ghali (1997), a key figure in the negotiations which led to 
the Camp David accords, indicated that the Egyptian delegation to the US did not know how to 
prepare for the conference. Nor was the general strategy upon which to base its movements clear. As 
he sarcastically suggested, “it was said that Napoleon Bonaparte never set a military plan until he 
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was in the battle field. It dallied my hopes that inspiration would come to us when we arrive at Camp 
David. However, I did not come across signs of Napoleonic genius among us” (Ghali 1997: 137, 
author's translation). This testimony, in itself, constitutes a most serious indictment of the pattern of 
negotiation followed by the Egyptian regime.  
Such indictments, however, do not end with Ghali. Raymond Cohen (1995) in addition 
observed that “...surely the single most noteworthy feature of the Camp David conference of 
September 1978 was Sadat’s willingness to place his own fate and that of his nation in the hands of 
the leader of a foreign power-President Carter.” Being at a total loss as to the next step that should 
follow after his visit to Jerusalem, a condition emanating precisely from the absence of a clear vision 
or strategy, Sadat’s only recourse was to rely on the American President. In as far as he had a 
strategy, it was to “put himself completely into American hands...project(ing) assumptions about the 
value of client status onto his relationship with the United States” (Cohen 1995: 55). Cohen cited 
both Kissinger and former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to make his point. According to 
Kissinger, Sadat worked at identifying Egypt’s interest with America’s own, repeatedly challenging 
the US to enter the negotiations not as mediator but as participant, or else he offered to accept what 
was put forward to him (Cohen, 1995: 55, emphasis added). In essence, he put his full trust in the 
American president willing, in the words of Vance, “to take Carter’s word that a given step was 
necessary...” (quoted by Cohen, 1995: 56). Rarely, as Cohen (1995: 56) described it, “can a patron-
client relationship have achieved such pronounced expression.” The logical outcome of this 
negotiating pattern was that Carter put Sadat’s trust to excellent use, although not quite in the way 
that the latter may have expected. “The US president, it turned out, was better able to separate 
business from friendship than the Egyptian leader” (Cohen, 1995: 56). This outcome was a product 
not only of traditional diplomatic frameworks, such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration, but also the presumably more advanced methods of conflict resolution. The latter 
emphasize the process of interaction (such as confidence building, education for mutual 
understanding and the pursuit of super-ordinate goals, including of course economic incentives) 
rather than the content of the negotiated positions (Reychler, 1994: 5-7). The two overlapping 
approaches nevertheless compromised core issues, leading Sadat to undermine Arab strategic 
entitlements in favor of short-term Egyptian territorial and financial gains. This ultimately translated 
into continued foreign domination of that country’s decision making structure while providing the 
negotiating adversary with an opportunity to single out its fragmented Arab opponents. 
The tragedy is that the Palestinian Authority seems to be following the same pattern of 
concessions of the Egyptian negotiator, yet without the assets and the leverage that the latter 
possessed. By offering the Israeli side the strategic concession that the largest and most powerful 
Arab country would drop out of the conflict equation, as a bargaining chip, Egypt could make 
territorial gains. Those gains came nevertheless at the cost of a de-militarized Sinai, and almost total 
loss of national independence, sovereignty, and self-esteem, as well as a significantly diminished 
regional status. “In the realm of strategy (however), a course of action cannot persist indefinitely. It 
will tend to evolve into its opposite, unless the logic of strategy is outweighted by some exogenous 
change in the circumstances of the participants” (Luttwak, 1987: 18, emphasis in quote). This 
exogenous factor was introduced in Israel’s favor by eliminating Egypt from the conflict matrix and 
neutralizing it as the principal adversary, and is currently being added to by bringing Turkey into the 
conflict as an Israeli ally. This is not in order that the latter may deliver more land subsequently to 
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the rest of the Arabs, but rather to enjoy a freer hand on Egypt’s North-Eastern flank. The Camp 
David accords, in other words, were the high points of the peace strategy after which the reversal of 
opposites can only set in. The more it is pursued the less the returns, until a point is reached where 
negative results can only ensue.9 As Heikal (1996a: 308, author's translation) has stated, 
there is nothing more dangerous-in regional and international politics-
from a condition of war that has stopped without a decisive end and 
without a mutual consent that forsakes (resorting) to arms. Under such a 
condition, explosion becomes possible at any time and without need for 
convincing reasons: for the reasons are inherent in this very condition 
and its nature. 
 
The above factors essentially constitute the dynamics of the peace dialectics. 
The Arab negotiators have three main alternatives: 1--to accept whatever is being imposed on 
them, seeking the best conditions under the circumstances, 2--to stall for time hoping for a reversion 
to the original land for peace formula, or 3--to counter-transform the negotiating rules by bringing in 
their own new formula and redefining the conflict in terms of its broader religious and strategic 
horizons At the same time negotiators would work actively toward the construction of new regional 
and systemic alliances. Opting for the first choice could very well preclude the second but more 
likely add fuel to the third. Mubarak’s (1997: 21) remark to Netanayahu that war is “...an old 
(fashioned) matter...and will not solve any cause” effectively presented the Israeli Prime Minister 
with an altered peace for peace formula. Furthermore, when the threat of economic boycott was 
furled by the Arab League, as a result of Israel’s continued building of colonies in Jabal Ghoneim 
(Har Homa) in occupied East Jerusalem, it was declared as a ‘recommendation’ rather than as an 
obligation. Associated calls for Arab countries to freeze their normalization of relations with Israel 
were declined by both Egypt and Jordan, on the grounds that they were tied to peace agreements 
with Israel which restricted them from doing so. 
To put forth a land for peace formula is to make a conditional statement. Intrinsic to it is a 
presumed veto power: if there is no land returned, there will be no peace. But to what extent can the 
Arabs exude such credibility? The Arab summit which, had convened in Cairo in June 1996, 
announced peace to be a “strategic choice.” Such a declaration de facto rendered land a residual 
component. If war is not an option nor are economic and diplomatic sanctions, then this essentially 
dissolves the Madrid formula, and its supposedly incorporated veto or conditionality. In line with 
Mubarak’s remark, the summit effectively reduced the formula to one of peace for peace’s sake. 
Nations which attempt to present themselves as unfailingly peaceful to the international community 
can hope to obtain little in the way of suasion from any forces they may have (Luttwak, 1987: 194). 
If they do not project much in terms of coercive credibility, sporadic violence will not uphold the 
required veto power. Islamist militants’ bombings for instance, is not the same thing as war 
capability, and could be dealt with at the local security level rather than within the broader context of 
the ‘peace’ process.  
Lacking control over their concession behavior the Arab decision-makers have contributed to 
the elimination of the second option altogether, even though they continue to demand its 
implementation. From then on, they can only move and act within the strict confines of an 
American-Israeli security framework, tilting the balances heavily in favor of option one. 
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Netanyahu’s intransigence and disrespect for agreements previously signed, and his successor’s 
negotiating pattern simply reflect consistent Israeli strategy and beliefs, common sense negotiation 
principles and calculations, and a well thought out understanding of the hard facts of the evolving 
situation. If the Arab negotiators in the course of their concessionary behavior were willing to 
undermine their entitlements, then naturally their opponent would not feel obliged to substantively 
revert to the less favorable linkage of land for peace. This goes for Barak as much as for Netanyahu. 
Netanyahu's less than subtle approach, served to expose three extremely important factors. In 
the maze of the perception altering processes that had overwhelmed the region, those factors were 
conveniently obscured from the Arab and Muslim people: 1--Israel's structural and expansionist 
threat, masked in terms of security concerns, to the whole region and not just the Palestinians, 2--the 
bankruptcy of the Arab regimes, and 3--the true nature and stakes of the civilizational conflict. In as 
far as there had been tense relations between the Clinton administration and Netanyahu, it had to do 
more with the absence of the subtlety required for the pursuance of the above strategy-a strategy 
which the Labor party is perceived to be much more adept at directing. Barak’s style has been more 
effective in reestablishing the space necessary for Arab regimes to make further concessions. In 
many respects and contrary to the impression given by Arab media and officials, Netanyahu has 
been a blessing in disguise. 
 
The Third Option 
In what is tantamount to a vicious circle, capitulation can only add to bitterness, resentment 
and ultimately to the mobilization of forces of indigenous resistance. This would be expected to 
bring forth even if in the long run option three. The Palestinian core of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
obscured the underlying religious and strategic foundations of the colliding wills. In as long as the 
focus was on the presumed confrontation between two nationalisms, Jewish and Palestinian, over the 
same piece of land, these more inherent contradictions were made less visible. 
With the gradual and steady collapse of nationalistic justifications and with the issue of 
Jerusalem coming to the forefront, the Arab-Israeli conflict is being relinked with the religious 
dimension and its coextensive strategic underpinnings. This linkage emerges from the insight that “a 
nation’s interest derive from its identity” (Huntington, 1997: 1). No longer is the confrontation 
solely over the same piece of land or scarce resources, be it territory or water, but more so over 
belief systems and basic values. Since Jerusalem is a religious cause, the clash over it can not be 
secularized (i.e. become solely a political issue). As such ‘peace’ outcomes and legalities will 
always remain marginal considerations applicable in the domain of politics to the extent that the 
coercive framework that produced them continues in place. In the realm of religion such limitations 
may not function as a long-term viable deterrent. The religious logic of the conflict would very 
likely alter the terms of confrontation from reduced objective calculations to subjective metaphysical 
convictions. Such sources of neo-hostility can not be settled by imposing legal norms and enforcing 
them against rule-breakers, since ultimately they are irrelevant to the conflict. Strategic policies of 
deterrence are unlikely to contribute to peace and are more likely to promote conflict as they 
frustrate the pursuit of entitlements, identity, and basic values (Burton, 1984: 137-138). 
In the Arab/Islamic World, Islamist groups are mostly motivated by the justice motive which 
is value oriented (entitlement-benefits), while actors committed to the ‘peace process’ tend to be 
more utility oriented (cost-benefits). Militant Islamic groups, and Muslims in general, continue as a 
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matter of faith and values to refuse to accept the basic existence of the enemy irrespective of what 
takes place at the political level. More fundamentally, these motives continue to be transferred from 
one generation to another in Islamic societies. Secondly, the contending parties to the conflict do not 
see anything in common with one another, nor is there any overwhelming desire or willingness to 
coexist (Abu-Nimer, 1996: 33-34). Thirdly, while the Palestinian issue is being transformed through 
the peace strategy, it is also being counter-transformed into a core religious principle, a substantive 
change foreshadowing a future Islamic-Jewish conflict. Whatever the political outcome of the 
‘peace’ process, it is unlikely to resolve this broader confrontation which is now slowly but steadily 
taking a more ominous tilt. The constant foundations of Islam limit the possibilities of absorbing the 
changes induced or imposed by the ‘peace’ process. This poses an acute problem for the application 
of Western conflict resolution mechanisms in an Islamic context. If a negotiating formula is 
understood to reflect “a shared perception or definition of the conflict that establishes terms of trade, 
the cognitive structure of referents for a solution, or an applicable criterion of justice” (Zartman & 
Berman, 1982: 1-2), then it is clear that it is none of these. Therefore, there is no negotiating formula 
in the first place. Negotiation “as a process in which divergent values are combined into an agreed 
decision, ... based on ... appropriate stages, sequences, behaviors and tactics...” can only fade into 
irrelevance (Zartman & Berman, 1982: 95). 
External mechanisms which, seek to emphasize or artificially construct common and super-
ordinate goals or interests do not apply in this case. They could very well be seen as just another 
attempt at superimposing alien modes of thought and structures. ‘Peace’ as a process of de-
escalation is not value free and does not bear the same implications for the different parties. Western 
power and conflict resolution principles for instance, frequently surmise that ‘peace making’ is not 
possible until conflicts have “ripened“ to the extent where costs have escalated to the point at which 
parties are prepared to settle (Burton, 1990: 88). In the process, “[d]eciding whether or not to try to 
de-escalate a conflict and which strategy to pursue, necessarily involves value preferences regarding 
an acceptable outcome” (Kriesberg & Thorson, 1991: 24). While war may be condemned all along, 
“sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of treaties, international police, and 
measures to assure peace remain” (Schmitt, 1976: 79). A sweeping look at the Arab/Islamic World 
may help demonstrate the implications: Egypt prostrate and ineffectual, Syria isolated and pressured, 
Jordan an American-Israeli vassal, Palestinians cantonized, Iraq destroyed, Libya and Sudan 
embargoed, the Arabian Peninsula virtually occupied, Algeria having undergone a bloodbath, and 
Iran and other militant Islamist groups being contained or crushed. This condition is contrasted with 
a robust Jewish State, militarily more powerful than all its potential adversaries and nuclear capable 
if not accessible. Given such asymmetry, no substantive inducements exist for a just resolution. 
Furthermore, to capitalize on the outcome of the Second Gulf War as an issue transforming 
event, Field (1994: 385) stressed that as a result of this war, the Arabs have come to recognize “...not 
only that they could not fight Israel but that many of them had no interest in doing so.” A conclusion 
which the majority of the people in the Arab World-as distinct from their largely de-legitimized 
regimes-may not particularly share, yet which mind and perception altering mechanisms seek to 
induce.10 Within this objective and psychological re-construction of the regional order, one can 
perceive Samuel Huntington’s (1993) “Clash of Civilizations” argument not simply as an intellectual 
exercise to be supported or refuted at the academic-analytic level, but more so as the theoretical 
cover for a policy in the actual process of implementation. This policy attempts to procure and 
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justify the ripe environmental conditions for the establishment of ‘peace’ while reconstructing the 
Muslim world and crushing grass roots Islamist groups. To the extent that Islam is an active value 
that determines the subjective, and where and when possible the objective nature of the conflict, it 
constitutes an organizational counter-mechanism which will continue to prohibit the alteration of the 
conflict structure as a zero-sum game. This stems from Arabs’ and Muslims’ awareness that if 
American-Israeli ‘peace’ is to constitute the region’s new interest, this will require the 
transformation of the region’s identity. Islam will be attacked on the plane of its basic values not 
merely on that of the political. 
The fact that Islam is entitlement driven (content-ontological) while the ‘peace’ process is 
cost articulated (process-epistemological), sets both on two incommensurable planes of interaction. 
Harmonizing thought systems alternatively necessitates that they be positioned within the same 
logical framework (Burton, 1990: 89). On the one hand, to harmonize ‘thought logics’ in the 
Arab/Muslim World, with that of the ‘peace’ strategy requires that counter-thoughts be either 
peripheralized and contained, or if necessary crushed. Identity configurations become at stake as 
land, despite its centrality, becomes secondary to more crucial civilizational considerations. Whereas 
an intractable conflict of the Arab-Israeli variety would require the consolidation and mobilization of 
a collective Islamic-Arab identity, the American-Israeli side conversely, has sought to impose the 
state secular identity as the highest value. Continued concessions by the Arab side have allowed 
their opponents to impose their own desired configuration. Primary and/or secondary identities are 
imposed not chosen as a result, as a direct outcome of the very structure of the negotiating process. 
This provided the Americans and the Israelis with the opportunity to single out the Arab parties. By 
accomplishing this purpose they have caused the Arabs to pursue contradictory and conflicting state 
policies, which ultimately led to their fragmentation, bringing them under virtual American (and 
Israeli) colonization and/or domination. Even by the standards of primacy of state values, the Arab 
‘state’ has been a failure.11 The exterme hostility to Islamist currents by parties to the ‘peace’ 
process actually reflects their opposition to any potential reconfiguration of regional identity in favor 
of religio-strategic valuations. Herein lies the essence of the so called‘clash of civilizations’ and its 
camouflaged link to the ‘peace’ process. All else is detail. On the other hand, an Arab negotiator 
whose thought logic is reconstructed within the very framework of his adversary’s is reduced 
basically to a supplicant rather than a counterpart. His will and perceptions of reality continue to be 
managed and altered by the opponent, with any settlement arrived at likely to hinge solely on 
contingent power relations.  
In focusing on the new Islamic enemy, the US has targeted what it calls ‘fundamentalist’ and 
‘terrorist’ groups, aiming with the collaboration of client regimes and to different degrees of success, 
at neutralizing and marginalizing them. Any Islamist oppositional group was depicted as a “disturber 
of peace...(and) designated to be an outlaw of humanity” (Schmitt, 1976: 79). Yet in so doing, both 
parties seem to overlook “...the dynamic way in which the environment of conflict gets out of 
control” (Burton, 1990: 52). While it may be feasible to crush such groups through the 
overwhelming power of the state and/or external assistance, this does not solve the problem as long 
as the environmental conditions leading to their emergence remain in place and regenerate. 
Secondly, their suppression does not necessarily lead to the containment of Islamic dynamism, since 
the vitality of Islam is not constrained by, nor dependent upon their existence. Islam has a long and 
inherent tradition of revival, renewal and resurgence. Thirdly, even though many of those groups 
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could or had been actually marginalized, by mainstreaming Islam in public life and society at large, 
they have nevertheless succeeded in scoring a major strategic victory. Despite his assessment of 
political Islam as a failure, Olivier Roy (1994: 78) could still notice that although the specter of 
Islamic revolution has been fading, Islamic symbols continue to penetrate the society and the 
political discourse of the Muslim world more than ever. In a dialectical fashion, the retreat of 
political Islam has been accomplished by the advancement of Islam as a social condition. What Roy 
does not appear to anticipate is the dynamics of exponential change that is independent of the 
existence of politicized groups but which, if unhindered, would ultimately lead to their victory. 
Exponential change is a substantive process, which involves a preliminarily slow and gradual 
subterranean shift.12 In its earlier stages it borders on being imperceptible or even natural, calling for 
no special attention or in all practicalities not much could be done about it. Serious difficulties 
would arise, for instance, if Muslims were to be pressured or dissuaded from practicing their faith or 
rituals. But then, rituals do have practical social consequences and implications, which can not be 
isolated from the overall environment. They keep the faith and its values alive and are the 
foundations of its reproduction and its social and political influence. Under stress, they are 
frequently imbued with socio-political content as an expression of protest and opposition. Given the 
nature of the conflict promoting environment created by ‘peace’ dialectics and its concomitant 
structures, ‘social’ Islam at one stage or the other may very well transform into a political wave of 
mainstream religious activism engulfing society at large. ‘Peace’ dialectics become conducive to the 
development of a religio-national psychological mode, cutting across diverse social strata, strongly 
disposed toward resisting its impositions. This transformation, while subtle, inevitably reflects the 
substantive differences in conflict perceptions based upon costs as opposed to entitlements. In 
contradistinction to the former quantification, the latter demarcations will be “basic,” “fundamental,” 
“consciousness” based and “less mutable” (Huntington, 1993: 22 & 29). Very few if any of the 
existing regimes appear capable, willing or qualified to make credible claims to such alternatives or 
deal with their transformative implications. For instance, Osama al-Baz, (1998: 6) the political 
advisor to Mubarak responded to the Israeli negotiator’s stalemating intransigence by declaring that 
the Arab states have ‘several’ options, the most important of which is the convening of a new 
international conference to save the peace process. Such statements which, reflect bankruptcy rather 
than the availability of any real choice structure, manifest a condition of entrapment. Entrapment is a 
decision-making process “whereby (regimes) escalate their commitment to a previously chosen, 
though failing, course of action in order to justify or ‘make good on’ prior investments.” This 
dynamic frequently leads to ‘irrational’ decision making and outcomes to the extent that it escalates 
commitment when de-escalation or opting out may be the more intelligent thing to do (Brockner & 
Rubin, 1985: 5 & 7).13 And while it may be argued that an alternative Islamist agenda may offer no 
assurances for a successful extrication, it would uphold a real measure of commitment and hope, 
given that the only guarantee the virtually failing ‘state’ seems to be able to offer is abject defeat.  
The ‘peace’ process is contributing to the regeneration and the recharging of its own nemesis 
by reconnecting religion to the internal and external organizing principles of politics and strategy. 
Such linkage would allow for an ideological thrust to bear, that could serve to mobilize 
Arab/Muslim society and to channel its commitments toward the counter-transformation of the 
negotiating rules. Islam as a national resource could create options and space that are vital within the 
context of the threats that the Arab and Muslim nation face. By redefining the conflict in terms of its 
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broader religious and strategic horizons, while working actively toward the construction of new 
identity reconfigurations, Islam could provide for a situation in which “an asymmetry in the 
[re]evaluation of stakes may offset an asymmetry in the national power of the participants in a 
struggle” (Lockhart, 1979: 93). Such potential may heavily tilt the balance against the existing 
negotiating regimes and erode their sense of security and legitimacy. Neutralizing such challenges 
has called for a collaborative effort, between local rulers on the one hand, and regional and global 
forces on the other, in order to crush militant or serious oppositional manifestations. Through 
suppression and ‘education for peace’ they seek to snuff out the very value system upon which 
Muslims’ motivations may come to be based on (i.e. Islam itself). ‘Peace’ and war on Islam/justice 
have become two congruent if not, in many ways, identical processes. 
 
Conclusion 
Religious and strategic factors continue to converge and conflate in their own special way, as 
the prospects of the American-Israeli ‘peace’ persist in harboring the roots of humiliation and 
bitterness. Defining Islam as the new enemy after the collapse of communism constitutes a strategic 
decision foreshadowing the American-Israeli project of redrawing the political and potentially 
geographical map of the Arab World. This upcoming wave will not only target disparate or 
marginalized Islamist groups or just Muslim regimes, but more broadly mainstream Islam and 
mainstream society. Expectations of the kind have slowly introduced a subtle messianic streak in 
conflict perceptions among many Muslims, and contributed to projecting images of upcoming 
apocalyptic events. 
These policies, aiming at restructuring regional identities, are becoming increasingly 
transparent, exposing Israel not solely as a Palestinian national security threat, but a much broader 
Arab/Islamic one. The conflict will likely continue to transform in direct proportion to the increasing 
intensity of threat perceptions. That Islam is being politicized is not simply a matter of a religious 
doctrine that does not allow for the separation of religion and politics, but more fundamentally, a 
matter of justice and strategic considerations as well as religious convictions. In its call to arms, 
Islam is not about violence and extremism but about the legitimate and unequivocal right to self-
defense. It is a statement that threats to security, identity and religious values can not be contained 
by suppression or by mere settlement arrangements. By the same token, ‘peace’ as cant is not about 
negotiations and cooperation but about the destruction of values. It is a statement that motives, at the 
very core of human needs and existence, will have to be neutralized and/or compromised.  
Western conflict resolution mechanisms do not seem to be well equipped to cope with these 
unique characteristics of present and future Arab-Israeli antagonisms, nor with their neo-hostility 
structures. Available theoretical constructs have externalized religious beliefs as determining 
components, reducing them to culturally alterable variables. Religiously held convictions, and 
especially Muslims’ views of their Jewish/Zionist adversary, remain fixed conflict parameters. 
Conflict theory’s reaction was to continue to reject such factors, largely as a source of cognitive 
dissonance, and to perceive religion more as a matter of unwelcome complexity that falls beyond the 
limits of the field, except perhaps as a reduced cultural variable. As a result, acts of violence and 
resistance perpetrated under the rubric of religious justification are either condemned as terrorist 
aberrations or analyzed and understood in a rather condescending fashion. What these theories have 
utterly failed to do is to address crucial questions regarding whether “the weak have the right to 
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make a different set of rules for themselves” (Orwell, 1981: 40). More importantly, how conflict 
mechanisms can cope with the Israeli-Palestinian showdown as only one facet of a multi-
dimensional conflict in which religion is a parameter not a variable, as these mechanisms imply. 
These implicit yet very real underpinnings will continue to undermine the impositions of the ‘peace’ 
process. The fear that the Arab/Muslim World would go ‘Islamist’ is the fear that Western 
settlement mechanisms do not and cannot meet the basic human needs of its people. 
 
Notes 
1 The Balfour Declaration dated November 2, 1917 was just five weeks before Jerusalem fell 
to the forces of the British General Edmund Allenby. In so doing, Great Britain was basically 
reneging on its promises of independence made to the Arabs in return for their support against the 
Turks during WWI (Heikal, 1996: 28-29). 
2 According to the King-Crane commission, appointed by American President Woodrow 
Wilson for the purpose of determining which of the Western nations should act as the mandatory 
power for Palestine, “...the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a 
‘right’ to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously 
considered.” (Laqueur & Rubin, 1995: 27). 
3 Harkabi was a former Chief of Israeli Military intelligence (1955-1959), and an advisor on 
intelligence to the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. While aiming at breaking-down the 
Arab consensus, the US subsequently proclaimed itself an “honest broker.” (US Letter of Assurances 
to the Palestinians, October 18, 1991, in Laqueur and Rubin, 1995: 576). In the same letter, the 
Americans indicated that negotiations would take place along two tracks between Israel and Arab 
States and Israel and Palestinians, effectively singling them out through the very structure of the 
negotiation framework (Laqueur and Rubin, 1995: 574). 
4 In a Report of a Study Group Convened by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences it 
was proposed: “Regional water plans would be an important component of the bilateral and 
multilateral accords. The opportunity to increase access to water would serve as one of the 
inducements for Israel to negotiate security accords with its neighbors. Projects to be given high 
priority would include the Unity Dam on the Yarmouk River involving Jordan, Syria and Israel, 
pipelines for water from the Litani River in Lebanon and from Turkey or Egypt, and a joint Jordan-
Israel desalinization plant in Eilat/Aqaba” (Lesch, 1992: 158). Notice the pattern of concessions 
required of the Arabs so that Israel would simply accept negotiating security accords with its 
neighbors; Israeli security of course being paramount over other actors’ considerations. A security 
for peace rather than the Madrid land for peace formula is clearly being suggested here several years 
before Netanyahu’s coming to power. 
5 According to Benjamin Netanyahu, Yitzhak Rabin, the assassinated Labor party leader and 
ex-Prime Minister, “was very clear that there were no limitations whatsoever on Israeli construction 
in Jerusalem. Rabin was the one who authorized the building of Har Homa (Jabal Ghoneim colony)” 
(Netanyahu, 1997a: 51). 
6 For instance, despite Barak's intransigence and in response to abstract pledges, the US 
declared its commitment to maintaining Israel's “qualitative edge” and “deterrent capability.” This 
included upgrading Israel's airforce and Arrow defense systems ($ 250 million), increasing aid from 
$ 1.9 billion to $ 2.4 billion a year, and finally obtaining congressional approval to provide $ 1.2 
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billion so that Israel can build “fortified” by-pass roads to isolated ‘settlements’ in the occupied 
West Bank to ensure a “secure” Israeli redeployment under the terms of the 1998 Wye agreement 
(Usher, 1999). 
7 Commenting on the result, and perhaps justifying Netanyahu’s position and his own call for 
redesigning the Oslo agreements, Kissinger stated that any analogy to the early stages of the peace 
process was illusory. As he put it “in the earlier negotiation, step-by-step progress relieved tensions 
and built confidence. On the West Bank, the opposite was the case. Both sides had jumped into the 
"peace process" without having clarified workable objectives and expected to wrest that clarity from 
the process itself. Instead, it has compounded their perplexities. This was no accident. Clearly, 
Arafat was led to believe by Israeli, American and European interlocutors that the final destination 
was at least the '67 borders and recognition of a Palestinian statehood. But that ignored the vast 
difference in the negotiations between Israel and the PLO compared with those between Israel and 
the neighboring Arab states” (Kissinger, 1997). 
8 Note how Mansour equates Jewish Israel with Arab Palestine and Jordan. He also seems to 
be insinuating that extending the water to Israel may be the price Egypt, in its ‘commitment’ to the 
Arab cause, may have to pay. In what is tantamount to a trial balloon, Mansour appears to be 
reviving the offer which Sadat had made in the early 1980s to extend the Nile water to Israel in 
return for Arab land; an offer which the Menachem Begin Likud government rejected at the time. 
This is where the Toushki project, claiming to create a new living space in the South-Western part of 
the country, may come in handy as a scenario. Based on this project, Egypt would make a case for 
much needed additional sources of water supply, which could be accessed if an agreement is reached 
whereby African states would gain financially. Egypt would receive more water and so would Israel. 
Any internal opposition could then be denounced as unpatriotic, foolish and perhaps even treasonous 
since it would undermine the ‘national project’ of Toushki. In this set scenario, providing Israel with 
water would be the ‘nationalistic’ thing to do. Perhaps at the heart of this matter lies Egypt’s real 
hostility to the Islamic regime in Sudan, which appears to be oblivious to financial incentives of the 
kind and therefore perceived as an obstacle to such a grand design. 
9 Moshe Dayan told President Jimmy Carter, before Anwar Sadat’s visit to Israel that “the 
future is with Egypt. If you take one wheel off a car, it won’t drive....” Mirroring this view, Carter 
indicated in his memoirs that “it was fairly obvious that the key to any future military threats against 
Israel was the Egyptians...” Yitzhak Rabin indicated “Syria alone was no problem whatsoever for 
Israel,” and that “terrorism is not a threat to Israel’s existence... I wish that the so called PLO would 
be the only problem.” “Egypt,” he stressed “is the key country” (quotes in Finkelstein 1995: 171). 
10 Commenting on several polls in the Arab World related to this matter, Edward Said (1995: 
134) observed: “In every instance public opinion has in fact expressed no enthusiasm for 
normalization with Israel. On mass level this suggests that the sense of defeat is not quite as 
widespread and prostrate as official policy and the logic of capitulationist intellectuals would have 
us believe.” In the same vein, an Al-Ahram Weekly poll result indicated that “the Egyptian public ... 
(has) its own ax to grind with Israel” (as quoted by Gerges 1995: 75). Even Shenouda III, the Coptic 
Patriarch of Egypt, prohibited his followers from making pilgrimages to Jerusalem, declaring that 
“(t)he Christians of Egypt will not be the traitors of the Arab World” (as quoted in Heikal, 1996a: 
553). 
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11 At the Oslo meeting held during the first week of November 1999, between Arafat, Barak 
and Bill Clinton, Barak, according to Newsweek “signaled his willingness to accept a Palestinian 
state. But to the consternation of the Clinton administration and Palestinian leaders, he also made it 
clear he wants to disentangle the two economies…. Many Palestinians believe that such 
disengagement would be a disaster…” Note the psychological pressure exerted and the clear 
Palestinian dependency on Israel. One can not but wonder as to the nature of the prospective ‘state’ 
(Klaidman & Rees, 1999). 
12 A typical exponential change curve moves along in an almost horizontal line for a long 
period of time (tradition) before showing any marked shift in direction. Then, once there is a 
significant increase in the rate of change there is a sudden acceleration until the curve moves into a 
nearly vertical direction--a wave of mainstream change or revolution (Burton, 1990: 53-54). 
13 Quote de-italicized. Irrationality here is not to be confused with the sense in which non-
rationality has been used above in the Finnish and Vietnamese cases. Irrational decisions could be 
made based on extreme caution and calculations. To many it would seem to be rational not to waste 
away sunk costs--a situation in which seeming rational inputs could lead to irrational outcomes. 
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